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I. INTRODUCTION 
For democracy and the rule of law to function and flourish, 
important actors in the justice system need sufficient independence 
from politicians in power to act under rule of law rather than political 
pressure. The court system must offer a place where government action 
can be reviewed, challenged, and, when necessary, limited to protect 
constitutional and legal bounds, safeguard internationally-recognized 
human rights, and prevent departures from a fair and impartial system 
of law enforcement and dispute resolution. Courts also should offer a 
place where government officials can be held accountable. People 
within and outside a country need faith that court decisions will be 
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made fairly and under law. Because the Council of Europe’s Group of 
States against Corruption (“GRECO”) deems judicial independence 
critical to fighting corruption, GRECO makes a detailed analysis of 
their members’ judicial system part of their member review process.1 
This Article is a case study of the performance of Poland’s mechanisms 
for judicial independence and accountability since 2015, a time of 
extreme political stress in that country. Readers will see parallels to 
comparable historical and current events around the world. 
Similar concerns arise regarding independence of other parts of 
the legal community from political control: lawyers (meaning a legal 
profession that can represent and advocate for clients including in 
matters versus the state),2 prosecutors, and the law faculties and 
professors who educate legal professionals.3 For all these legal actors, 
 
1.  The Council of Europe established GRECO in 1999 to monitor the forty-nine member 
states’ compliance with the organization’s anti-corruption standard. Membership comprises 
forty-eight European countries and the United States. What is Greco?, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/about-greco/what-is-greco [https://perma.cc/CG2D-K6GR] 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2018); see infra notes 74-135 and accompanying text for discussion of 
GRECO’s recent conclusions and concerns about Poland. 
2.  For historical reasons Poland has two separate bars of practicing lawyers: legal advisors 
and advocates. Izabela Kraśnicka, Polish Legal Education in the Light of the Recent Higher 
Education Reform, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 691, 701-03 (2012) (explaining the five Polish 
apprenticeship tracks as well as similarities and differences between the legal advisor and 
advocate professions). On September 18, 2018, the Polish legal advisors’ profession changed 
their name to attorney-at-law, see OIRPWARSZAWA, https://www.oirpwarszawa.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/uchwa%C5%82a-102_2018-KRRP.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WJS-
93Y5] (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).  Concerning the differences between the US single legal 
profession system and the system of multiple professions in European countries, see Laurel S. 
Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s Legal Ethics Code—Part 1: An Analysis 
of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10-11 (1993); infra notes 13 & 14 and 
accompanying text.  
3.  The Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (“Mount Scopus 
Standards”) are an effort by a global group of academics and judges to formulate judicial 
independence standards applicable across legal and governmental systems and applicable to 
judges on both national and international tribunals. They seek to set minimum guarantees for the 
independence that both individual judges and a system’s judiciary need while also articulating 
appropriate mechanisms for democratic accountability of the judiciary. Although focused on 
judicial independence, Article 9 of the Mount Scopus Standards recognizes the significant roles 
that lawyers, legal education, bar associations, and education of the public play in assuring 
appropriate judicial independence. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
AND WORLD PEACE, Mount Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (Mar. 19, 
2008), https://www.jiwp.org/mt-scopus-standards [https://perma.cc/H6GG-YQN9]; Shimon 
Shetreet, Creating a Culture of Judicial Independence: The Practical Challenge and the 
Conceptual and Constitutional Infrastructure, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 17, 22 (S. Shetreet & C. Forsyth 
eds.,  2012) (on the importance of an independent legal profession in creating an independent 
judiciary in post-communist societies). 
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individually and in the collective bodies they form, independence from 
government control (at least meaning ruling political officials) is 
justified by the important public functions that independence serves. 
Unfettered professional independence, however, can cross a line to 
guild protection, self-service, arrogance, and forgetting the societal 
reasons for independence. Hence, the concern to balance independence 
with accountability.4 
This Article offers a cautionary tale about how attempts by 
political leaders to control the courts can be couched in accountability 
terms, while in practice operating as instruments of political control.5 
Governmental structure alone does not guarantee judicial 
independence.6 The legitimate functioning of governmental structures, 
e.g., a National Judiciary Council, depend on a country’s culture and 
the respect of its officials for often unwritten and unspoken bounds 
separating the branches of government.7 
In US courts, separation of powers and checks and balances offer 
one model for judicial independence, although federal and multiple 
state courts vary in whether elected officials play a role in the selection 
and retention of judges and prosecutors, as well as with regard to 
matters such as court structure and budget.8 With the interaction in state 
and federal governments in the US federal system, one level of 
government sometimes checks the other’s power, e.g., when state and 
local government officials challenge federal actions.9 
 
4.  DAVID KOSAŘ, PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: 
HOLDING THE LEAST ACCOUNTABLE BRANCH TO ACCOUNT 2 (2016) (describing the inevitable 
clash of these two principles such that “[a]ll democratic countries . . . have to find the right 
equilibrium” between them). 
5.  Id. at 7, 9, 13, 16, 57, 68 (terming abuses of accountability mechanisms “perversions” 
of accountability); id., ch. 6, at 236-333 (discussing such abuses in Slovakia). 
6.  See generally id. (comparing the Czech experience with the Ministry of Justice model 
of judicial independence and accountability with the Slovakian National Judiciary model).  
7.  See infra notes 17, 376-379, and 381 and accompanying text. 
8.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FAQS: JUDGES IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2014), available at http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/
judge_faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDS3-36RL]; see generally David J. Barron, Judicial 
Independence and the State Court Funding Crisis, 100 KY. L.J. 755 (2011). 
9.  See generally, Claire McCusker, The Federalism Challenges of Impact Litigation by 
State and Local Government Actors, 118 YALE L.J. 1557 (2009); Sadurski, Wojciech, How 
Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding  (63 
Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103491 
[https://perma.cc/5V53-UKAU] (discussing the weakness of Polish institutions in withstanding 
“anti-constitutional populist backsliding” and pointing out federalism as a  “veto point” in 
systems with that form of government).  
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This Article considers the Polish case regarding the delicate 
balance between judicial independence and accountability. Poland’s 
judicial structure follows the National Judiciary Council model, one of 
the two principal models for judicial governance that are common in 
civil law countries with parliamentary governments.10 A National 
Judiciary Council with overall authority in judicial appointment, 
retention, discipline, budget, and court management provides a 
structure meant to secure the judiciary’s place as a separate, co-equal 
branch of government. 
The path to the judiciary and its relationship to the other legal 
professionals in many civil law countries is quite different from that in 
the United States.11 Most civil law judges enter the judiciary track in a 
national system immediately after completing their academic  legal 
education and remain there, perhaps advancing to be the president of a 
court, to a higher court, or to a more desirable city.12 This differs greatly 
from the US system where the juris doctor (“JD”) and a state bar exam 
are the usual single point of entry to all future careers in the law.13 US 
lawyers may take positions as prosecutors or judges at some point in 
their legal careers and then move on to another type of job.14 Lawyers 
normally become judges only after a number of years practicing law, 
whether in private practice, as in-house counsel, prosecution, another 
government position, public defense, or a nongovernmental 
organization. Many state and federal judges do not seek to move 
beyond the bench to which they were appointed or elected. If a US 
judge moves to a higher court, this usually is through an election or 
 
10.  KOSAŘ, supra note 4 at 131-35 (discussing five models of European court 
administration with the Ministry of Justice model as the “longest-standing one” and the judicial 
council model now common in Central and Eastern Europe).   
11.  Id. at 12, 118-19 
12.  In Poland, law graduates now usually enter this track through the Szkoła Sądownictwa 
i Prokuratury (“SSIP”), the school for judges and prosecutors, which provides classroom 
instruction combined with apprenticeship in the courts. Kraśnicka, supra note 2, at 704; 
Fryderyk Zoll, The System of Judicial Appointment in Poland—A Question of the Legitimacy of 
the Judicial Power, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 3, at 301, 308-
09. 
13.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Lawyers, in OCCUPATIONAL 
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, available at https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/mobile/lawyers.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J5N3-LRE6]. 
14.  Professional Legal Ethics: A Comparative Perspective, CEELI CONCEPT PAPER 
SERIES, 2-6 (2002), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/
roli/misc/professional_legal_ethics_con_paper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VC3-
HNPM] (central difference in US legal profession from European ones of a unitary rather than 
divided legal professions). 
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appointment system in which judicial peers and superiors play little or 
no role.15 Unlike Poland and some other civil law systems, the US 
practicing bar and public often have a significant role in judicial 
selection and retention while fellow judges have little or no role.16 
Part II provides the reader background on the pre-2015 framework 
for judicial independence in Poland, as well as the Authors’ critique of 
it; the dramatic changes since 2015; and the pushback among Polish, 
international, and European institutions to those changes.  
Part III presents this Article’s thesis. In 1989, the Solidarity 
Roundtable negotiators pressed for a system in which appointment, 
performance assessment, court administration, promotion, discipline, 
and indeed most aspects of a judge’s career and the judicial system, 
would be self-governed by the judiciary through the National Judiciary 
Council structure and general governance system for the courts.  The 
Solidarity negotiators’ design has provided some important defenses to 
withstand the recent assaults on the Polish judiciary.  
Part IV briefly identifies issues that Poland will face in undoing 
the damage done since late 2015 and reviews modifications of the pre-
2015 judicial system that should be considered when calmer times 
return. The conclusion reminds readers that Poland is not the only 
nation whose judiciary faces political headwinds. Considering how 
Poland’s institutions have (and have not) withstood political stress, and 
the assistance that regional, international, and civil society 
organizations have provided, as well as the limits of their influence, is 
a useful case study for other countries as well. The Polish experience 
also demonstrates how accountability mechanisms can become 
weapons of destruction without widely accepted and shared cultural 
norms on “judicial virtue,” the role of the judiciary versus other 
 
15.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 8 (ways US state 
and federal judges are selected, evaluated, and retained). 
16.  Id. at  4 (discussing state judicial selection where attorneys and laypersons serve along 
with judges on commissions recommending judicial appointments to governors including those 
in which lay members are the majority); 7-8 (how state judges are reappointed or retained); 9-
10 (judicial performance evaluation systems for state judges including questionnaires to 
attorneys, jurors, litigants, witnesses, and court staff, as well as other judges); 11-14 (path to the 
bench and retention of federal judges); James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the 
Organized Bar in State Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. 
REV. 683, 684-91 (2002). 
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branches of government, and bounds, if crossed, that threaten 
democracy and the rule of law.17 
Since this Article’s first presentation at the Fordham Stein 
Center’s December 2017 international legal ethics conference,18 the 
European Union has become an increasingly important actor in the 
struggles regarding judicial independence and accountability in 
Poland.19 Hence, it is fitting that this Article appears in the Fordham 
International Law Journal issue focusing on EU law and 
commemorating Professor Roger Goebel’s years of significant 
contributions to the Journal.20 This Article was updated on Polish 
events and the European and international actors reacting to them 
through January 30, 2019 and  does not address subsequent events. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Section A provides a capsule history of Poland’s complex history 
since the nation’s sovereignty was restored a century ago, focusing in 
particular on how and why the Solidarity Roundtable process, when 
negotiating the transition from communism, insisted on a strong form 
of judicial independence.21 Section B.1 considers actions of the 
government since the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość party (the Law and 
Justice party, commonly referred to by its Polish acronym PiS) returned 
to power in 2015. PiS “reforms” of the judicial system have been multi-
front, complex, contentious, and in the forefront of much of the 
international attention focused on Poland. When PiS came back to 
power in 2015, their leaders understood that bringing the judicial 
 
17.  KOSAŘ¸ supra note 4, at 19, 428 (describing the importance of “accountability-as-a-
virtue,” including a “well-developed sense among academics, lawyers, and judges themselves 
of how judges ought to behave, what it means to be a good judge”); infra note 381 (discussing 
the guardrails of democracy). 
18.  Regulation of Legal and Judicial Services Conference, FORDHAM U. SCH. OF 
L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/26666/regulation_of_legal_and_judicial_services_conferenc
e [https://perma.cc/M9L3-L8GY] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
19.  See infra notes 228-325 and accompanying text.  
20.  Deborah L. Rhode, International Legal Ethics: The Evolution of a Field, 42 FORDHAM 
INTL. L. J. 218, 225 (2018) (reference to the Stein Center’s October 10-11, 1991 conference on 
Internationalization of the Practice of Law and Professor Goebel’s book on international legal 
practice co-authored with the then Stein Center Director Mary Daly).  Attending the 1991 
Fordham conference referenced in this Article sparked Co-Author Wortham’s interest in 
international legal ethics. 
21.  For an excellent summary of Polish history, economics, and politics since the end of 
Communist rule and the PiS party’s return to power in 2015, see Change of State, THE 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 2018, at 43-45.  
882 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
system under political control was crucial to the success of their other 
policy aims.22 PiS’s philosophy and policy aims have been consistent 
since the party’s founding.23 Section B.2 reviews expressions of PiS’s 
view that courts should not stand in the way of a popularly-elected 
government, albeit one elected by a relatively modest portion of the 
eligible electorate,24 and a majority government’s view of the national 
interest.  
Section B.3 reviews the campaign that the PiS government has 
waged against the Polish judiciary. Recent PiS statements talk about 
judiciary reform in terms of increased accountability, responsiveness 
to the public, reduced delay, greater efficiency, and so on. These, 
however, are not the objectives of their dismantling of the existing 
system. Rather than an effort to improve the judicial system’s 
functioning, PiS initiatives are based in an ideological view that courts 
should not stand in the way of a majoritarian will.25 The PiS changes, 
if fully implemented, will give the political branches effective control 
of the courts.  
Section C’s account of international, European, and civil society 
concerns about Poland points out the substantive areas in which Polish 
government has moved, e.g., treatment of nongovernmental 
organizations, control of public media, loosening environmental 
regulations, politicization of the civil service and military. Section D 
reviews past proposals for improving the Polish judicial system and 
discusses ways that the system’s functioning may have left Polish 
judges and courts vulnerable to attack.  
A. Polish Judicial Independence and Institutions in Historical Context 
When Poland regained independence in 1918 after almost 125 
years of partition, the country inherited five legal systems (Austrian, 
 
22.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
23.  Party History, PIS, http://pis.org.pl/partia/historia-partii [https://perma.cc/N2Z9-
SNR5] (last visited July 31, 2018). 
24.  Sadurski, supra note 9, at 2 (PiS received 37.5% of the vote with a turnout of 59.9%, 
18% of those eligible to vote),  60 (15% of votes cast were “wasted” because they were cast for 
parties that did not meet the 5% threshold for a party to be represented in the Polish parliament).  
25.  Cf. KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 82 (2009) (quoting 
Hamilton’s Federalist 78 on the “counter-majoritarian function” of the courts, a “necessary 
check on the people themselves” and a guard against “serious oppressions of the minor party in 
the community”). 
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Hungarian, German, Polish-French, and Russian).26 At independence, 
the court systems of the previous ruling empires (Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, and Germany) were in place.27 In the period until Polish 
independence ended with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, the 
country worked on developing a unification of law and the judicial 
systems.28 The May Coup of 1926 by Józef Piłsudski pushed the 
fledgling republic toward a more authoritarian system, including 
efforts for the state to control the judiciary.29 
During World War II, Germany annexed large parts of Polish 
territory while the Soviet Union invaded other parts of the country.30 
People in those territories became subject to the German and Soviet 
legal and judicial systems.31 The remaining portion of the interwar 
Polish nation was under Nazi control in the “General Gouvernement,” 
although this area was not formally incorporated into the German 
Reich.32 In this General Gouvernement area, the Polish Supreme Court 
was abolished, but lower Polish courts continued to function to some 
degree regarding matters among Poles, though as a practical matter, 
under the full control of the German authorities.33 
After World War II, a communist government took power in 
Poland under significant Soviet influence.34 In the period of Stalinist 
 
26.  ADAM ZAMOYSKI, POLAND: A HISTORY 307 (2009) (referring to four legal systems 
without naming them, but this does not take into account the differing Austrian and Hungarian 
roots of the legal system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which ruled part of the divided 
Poland).  
27.  NORMAN DAVIES, GOD’S PLAYGROUND—A HISTORY OF POLAND: VOL. II 1795 TO 
THE PRESENT 298 (revised ed. 2015) (three legal codes in place).  
28. Adam Lityński, History of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland, THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND (June 6, 2018, 01:06 PM), 
http://www.sn.pl/en/about/SitePages/History.aspx [https://perma.cc/25QF-DSBM] (discussing 
the 1921 constitution based on the Montesquieu principle of three separate powers and the period 
until the unification of the common courts in 1929). 
29.  Grzegorz Ławnikowicz, Sędziowie w autorytarnej Polsce [The Judges in 
Authoritarian Poland], (31) 2 KWARTALNIK KRAJOWA RADA SĄDOWNICTWA 14 (2016), e.g., 
the following quote: “Teraz już w przypadku wszystkich sądów decyzja o tym, kto zostanie 
sędzią i kto awansuje, należała do ministra.” [“From that point, the decision as to who should be 
appointed a Judge, and who is to be promoted rested upon the minister”] (available in Polish, 
translated by co-author Zoll). 
30.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 315; DAVIES, supra note 27 at 324. 
31.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 315. 
32.  Id. at 316-17. 
33.  JULIUSZ BARDACH, BOGUSŁAW LEŚNODORSKI, & MICHAŁ PIETRZAK, HISTORIA 
USTROJU I PRAWA POLSKIEGO [THE HISTORY OF POLISH LAW AND POLITICAL SYSTEM] loc. 
1546 – 48 (2009) (ebook). 
34.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26 at 332-36. 
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sway in Poland (1947-56), communist authorities almost completely 
controlled the Polish government, of which the judiciary was an 
integral part.35 For example, the communist party ultimately directed 
and ordered outcomes in criminal prosecutions.36 Some space for 
judicial independence opened in the post-Stalinist thaw beginning in 
1956 and continued until the imposition of martial law in 1981.37 
During this period, the mechanisms for state control persisted, but 
communist authorities varied in their choice to exercise them. Some 
Polish judges became experts in working within open spaces.38 Under 
martial law, the state reasserted political control of the judiciary in 
seeking to control outcomes in political trials. Some judges and 
prosecutors sought to go as far as they could in their positions  to avoid 
or mitigate this political influence while staying in their positions.39 
Many Polish judges, however, resigned in reaction, and some became 
advocates (that being the Polish legal profession authorized to appear 
in court representing criminal defendants).40 
In the 1980s, the unicameral Parliament of the communist 
government (“the Sejm”) amended the Polish constitution to create 
three institutions normally associated with democratic government and 
the rule of law: the Superior Administrative Court (1980), which has 
the authority to review administrative decisions;41 a Constitutional 
 
35.  Id. at 346. 
36.  Id. at 351 (noting that during this period, “the criminal justice system was geared not 
so much to delivering justice as to protecting the social, economic and political order”). 
37.  For references to the “thaw,” see ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 359; DAVIES, supra 
note 27, at 437. 
38.  ADAM LITYŃSKI, HISTORIA PRAWA POLSKI LUDOWEJ [HISTORY OF THE LAW IN THE 
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF POLAND] 44-45 (2010) (Communist leaders put pressure on judges in 
some cases but the “majority of judges” had the ability to maintain independence but for a few 
instances of “telephone justice” in Poland.). Telephone justice refers to informal influence or 
pressure exerted on the judiciary, a common term referring to the way regimes deal with the 
judiciary. See, e.g., Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 J. POST-SOVIET AFF. 324 
(2008).  
39.  LITYŃSKI, supra note 38 at 45 (after introduction of martial law, one judge was 
arrested, and others were detained, investigated, or subject to search of their apartment or 
removed); ADAM STRZEMBOSZ & STANISŁAW ZAKROCZYMSKI, MIĘDZY PRAWEM I 
SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCIĄ [BETWEEN LAW AND JUSTICE] 145 (2017 ) (on judges’ difficult decisions 
whether to remain in their positions).  
40.  STRZEMBOSZ & ZAKROCZYMSKI, supra note 39, at 145 (large number of resignations 
after martial law ended).  
41.  Artykuł 1 i 2 ustawy z dnia 31.01.1980 o Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym oraz 
o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego [Law on the Superior 
Administrative Court], Dz. U. 1980 nr. 4 poz. 8 (Pol.). 
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Tribunal (1982);42 and an Ombudsman (1987).43 The Sejm adopted 
laws implementing the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal 
(1985)44 and Ombudsman (1987).45 Although the government’s 
intention may have been propaganda, the institutions rather quickly 
began taking some actions to protect citizens’ rights. 
With the practical collapse of the Polish economic system in the 
late 1980s, communist rulers became open to sharing power (and 
responsibility for the problem) with the Solidarity-based opposition.46 
A negotiation process on sharing power commenced, and “the 
Roundtable” process proceeded from February 6 until April 5, 1989.47 
The future status and operation of the judiciary was an important 
element of these negotiations.48 
The Roundtable process led to an election in June 1989 with free 
voting for one-third of the Sejm, which was now the lower chamber of 
a bicameral Parliament.49 The remaining voting was restricted to 
 
42.  Ustawa z dnia 26.03.1982 o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej 
[Law on the Amendment of the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic], Dz. U. 1982 nr.11 
poz. 83 (Pol.). 
43.  Ustawa z dnia 15.07.1987 o Rzeczniku Praw Obywatelskich [Law on the 
Ombudsman], Dz. U. 1987 nr. 21 poz. 123; DAVIES, supra note 27, at 500 (referring to 
appointment of ombudsman and stating, “[b]ut there were no citizens’ rights worth speaking 
of.”) (Pol.). 
44.  Ustawa o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym z 29 kwietnia 1985 [The April 25, 1985 Law on 
the Constitutional Tribunal], Dz. U. 1985, poz. 98, g.ekspert.infor.pl/p/_
dane/akty_pdf/DZU/1985/22/98.pdf#zoom=90 [https://perma.cc/7DY8-FKQY] (Pol.). 
45.  Ustawa z 15 lipca 1987 o Rzeczniku Praw Obywatelskich [The July 15, 1987 Law on 
the Ombudsman], Dz. U. 1987, poz. 123 (current version Dz. U. 2017, poz. 958), 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/ustawa-o-rzeczniku-praw-obywatelskich 
[https://perma.cc/YFD9-7QHP] (Pol.). 
46.  Marek Dobrowolski, Ustrój państwa w porozumieniu Okrągłego Stołu [Poland’s 
Political System in the Round Table Agreement], (92) 2 PRZEGLĄD SEJMOWY 77, 78-80 (2009); 
JERZY LUKOWSKI & HUBERT ZAWADZKI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF POLAND 314, 316 (2d ed. 
2006); DAVIES, supra note 27, at 493-94 (describing the deterioration of the Polish economy).  
47.  Brian Porter, The 1989 Polish Round Table Revisited: Making History, 6 J. INT’L INST 
1 (1999), available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0006.301?rgn=main;view=full
text [https://perma.cc/3YK4-MPBC]; Co-author Zoll’s father, Andrzej Zoll, was Solidarity’s 
legal expert in the 1989 Roundtable negotiations as well as a Judge of the Constitutional Tribunal 
(1989-1997), Tribunal President (1993-1997), and Polish Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights 
(Polish Ombudsman) (2000-2006).  Regarding the Roundtable process, see also DAVIES, supra 
note 27, at 501-03; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 317; ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26 
AT 381-82; TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE’S GHOSTS AFTER 
COMMUNISM 232-36 (1995).   
48.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 381-82 (Roundtable agreement “guaranteed . . . the 
independence of the judiciary”).  
49.  Regarding the 1989 election, see ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 382, 384; DAVIES supra 
note 27, at 504; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 317-18. 
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selecting among names offered by the Communist party (Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) and two of its satellite parties, 
Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (Agrarian Party) and Stronnictwo 
Demokratyczne (Democratic Party) in a formula such that the 
communist party could not achieve an absolute majority. Because the 
Solidarity-backed opposition overwhelmingly carried the “free” one-
third voting, the Solidarity-based opposition was able to form a 
coalition government with the Agrarian and the Democratic parties, 
and take power from the communists. 
The Roundtable agreement created the Polish Presidency. In one 
of the Roundtable compromises, the Parliament elected communist 
leader Wojciech Jaruzelski to the position.50 Under the agreement, 
control of the police, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and of the 
military remained under communist party control.51 Solidarity 
negotiators insisted on a strong form of judicial independence as a 
counterbalance to government control of the police and military.52 In 
practice, however, President Jaruzelski generally did not impede the 
shaping of the government in to democratic form.53 
The newly-formed 1989 Parliament moved quickly in several 
respects important to the judiciary including the addition of a 
constitutional provision declaring that “the Polish Republic is a 
democratic country observing the rule of law and implementing the 
principles of social justice.”54 Six new judges were elected to the then-
twelve-member Constitutional Tribunal (“Tribunal”), which meant that 
six pre-transition judges remained. The newly-constituted Tribunal 
 
50.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 384. 
51.  DAVIES supra note 27, at 504; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 318; 
ROSENBERG, supra note 47, at 238. 
52.  Krzysztof Grajewski, Postulat utworzenia rady do spraw sądownictwa podczas obrad 
Okrągłego Stołu [A Proposal for the Establishment of a National Judiciary Council during the 
Round Table Proceedings], (36) 3 KWARTALNIK KRAJOWA RADA SĄDOWNICTWA 25 (2017); 
Andrzej Friszke, Przy Okrągłym Stole. O Polskę–- demokratyczne państwo prawa [By the 
Round Table: For Poland -Toward A Rule of Law Country], 37 KWARTALNIK KRAJOWA RADA 
SĄDOWNICTWA 29 (2017). 
53.  DAVIES, supra note 27, at 506 (Jaruzelski’s agreement to shorten his presidential 
term); TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION: SOLIDARITY 362 (3d ed. 2002) 
(describing his “place of honor in Polish history for the way he initiated and then presided over 
the transition to democracy from 1989 to 1991,” as weighed regarding the imposition of martial 
law in 1981); id. at 363 (describing Jaruzelski’s role in peaceful changes in Poland); id. at 372 
(describing a “model of self-restraint”). 
54.  LESZEK GARLICKI, POLSKIE PRAWO KONSTYTUCYJNE [POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW] 76 (2017) (Pol.). 
2019] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 887 
commenced interpreting the previously-quoted language in 
concretizing the Polish rule of law framework.55 
In a Roundtable agreement, all sitting Supreme Court judges were 
terminated by a 1989 law.56 Twenty-two of the 111 then sitting were 
reappointed to a fifty-seven-member bench.57 Generally, judges in the 
lower courts remained in place subject to a required lustration 
certification.58 
Between 1989 and 2005, eleven people served as Prime Minister 
of Poland. Parliamentary leadership switched among the parties rooted 
in the Solidarity movement versus those with ties to the previous 
communist regime.59 Neither the Solidarity movement nor the post-
communist parties had a unified political philosophy and both, to some 
degree, included a broad spectrum of political interests from right, left, 
labor, and so on.60 
In 2005, the PiS party candidates received a quarter of the vote, 
sufficient for a plurality in the parliament and the capacity to form a 
coalition government.61 A PiS leader, Lech Kaczyński, was elected 
President. The PiS coalition government collapsed in 2007.62 
In 2007, Platforma Obywatelska (Citizen Platform with the Polish 
acronym “PO”) received a plurality in the parliamentary election and 
created a coalition with the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (the 
previously-mentioned Polish agrarian party’s return to their previous 
 
55.  See Leszek Garlicki, Pierwsze Orzeczenie Trybunału Konstyucyjnyjnego—Refleksje 
15 Lat Później [The First Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal—Remarks 15 Years 
Later], in TRYBUNAŁ KONSTYTUCY KSIȨGA 15-LECIA [THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL—
THE BOOK OF 15 YEARS] 32 (2001), available at http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/
dokumenty/pierwsza-rozprawa/Leszek_Garlicki_Pierwsza_rozprawa.pdf [https://perma.cc/34
AC-US7Q] (describing the first Constitutional Tribunal case of May 26, 1986, which set limits 
on the executive branch’s scope to implement statutes and on retroactive application of law). 
56.  Lityński, supra note 28. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Lustration laws have been defined as “special public employment law that regulates 
the process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public positions worked or 
collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the communist regime.”  See Roman David, 
Lustraton Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Llustration Policy in the Czech 
Republic and Poland (1989-2001), 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 388 (2003).   
59.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 389-94; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADZKI, supra note 46, at 320-
23; DAVIES, supra note 27, at 512-13. 
60.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 397, 398. 
61.  THE ECONOMIST, Change of State, supra note 21, at 29, 30; LUKOWSKI & ZAWADSKI, 
supra note 46, at 340. 
62.  ZAMOYSKI, supra note 26, at 395-96. 
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name) to form a government.63 In 2010, President Lech Kaczyński led 
a delegation of ninety-six prominent Poles to Smolensk, Russia to 
commemorate the murder of more than 20,000 Polish officers by the 
Soviet secret police in Katyń Forest in 1940.64 The plane crashed, 
killing everyone on board.65 Under Polish law, Bronisław 
Komorowski, the Speaker of the Sejm, assumed the duties of the 
president until an election could be held.66 At his death, Lech 
Kaczyński was ending his presidential term and had indicated he would 
seek a second term.67 With his death, his twin brother, Jarosław 
Kaczyński, became the PiS candidate for President against  
Komorowski, who was the PO candidate.68 Komorowski narrowly 
prevailed after two rounds of voting.69 In 2011, PO remained in power 
in the same coalition, the first reelection of a government in the post-
communist period.70 
In the May 2015 Presidential election, the PiS party candidate, 
Andrzej Duda, was elected. In the October 2015 parliamentary 
election, PiS achieved an absolute majority in the Parliament.71 The PiS 
 
63.  Id. at 396. 
64.  Nicholas Kulish, Ellen Barry & Michal Piotrowski, Polish President Dies in Jet Crash 
in Russia, N.Y. TIMES (April 10, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/
world/europe/11poland.html?module=inline.   
65.  See id.; see also Anne Applebaum, A Warning from Europe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Oct. 2018, at 53, 59-60 (on the lingering effect of the Smolensk crash on Polish politics).  
66.  Nicholas Kulish, Amid Uncertainty, Poland Shows Political Resilience, N.Y. TIMES 
(April 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/europe/12poland.html. 
67.  Luke Harding, Polish President and Leading Advisers Among Victims of Smolensk 
Plane Crash, THE GUARDIAN (April 10, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/apr/10/polish-president-kaczynski-killed-crash [https://perma.cc/8PL9-ADQT]. 
68.  Matthew Day, Twin Brother of Dead Polish President to Run for Office, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 26, 2010), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/
7635252/Twin-brother-of-dead-Polish-president-to-run-for-office.html [https://perma.cc/
7BWY-Z488]. 
69.  Nicholas Kulish, Acting President in Poland Wins a Narrow Victory, N.Y. TIMES (July 
4, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/05/world/europe/05poland.html. 
70.  Nicholas Kulish, Poland’s Centrist Leader Secures A Second Term, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/world/europe/donald-tusk-wins-second-term-
as-polish-prime-minister.html.  
71.  Change of State, supra note 21. Although PiS parliamentary candidates received only 
37.58% of the votes cast, this was a sufficient plurality to form a government without a coalition. 
The Polish Constitution has a 5% threshold such that parties receiving less than 5% cannot be 
seated in Parliament. PiS received a ruling majority with the votes of 18.5% of eligible voters. 
Rozmawiała Agnieszka Kublik, Prof. Markowski: Demokracja się obroni, ale Wersalu nie 
będzie, [Professor Markowski: Democracy will defend itself, but there will be no Versailles), 
WYBORCZA.PL (Oct. 28, 2015, 1:00 AM), wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19099177,prof-markowski-
demokracja-sie-obroni-ale-wersalu-nie-bedzie.html [https://perma.cc/M9FN-XTCW]; 
PAŃSTWOWA KOMISJA WYBORCZA [NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION], Wybory do Sejmu 
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party does not have the two-thirds majority required to make 
constitutional changes but has adequate voting power to make changes 
in law. 
B. PiS Government Initiatives with Regard to the Judicial System 
2015-2018 
Subsection II.B.1 identifies the most significant and damaging 
changes to the Polish judicial system since 2015.72  Subsections II.B.2 
and II.B.3 review quotes from the PiS platform and leaders that 
evidence their objectives with regard to the judicial system. Subsection 
II.C reviews some of the dizzying number of reports and actions on the 
Polish situation by regional, international, and nongovernmental 
organizations. Finally, Subsection II.D discusses changes to the pre-
2015 judicial system that the Authors have proposed in the past and 
believe should be considered in the future if the Polish political and 
legal systems again were proceeding on a rational basis in conformity 
to the Polish constitution and international norms. 
1. Changes to the Polish Judicial System since 2015 
         The following lists the serious current problems in the Polish 
judicial system while omitting detail on the complex path that brought 
them about including multiple amendments, court challenges, 
President Andrzej Duda’s summer 2017 veto of two of three major 
pieces of legislation concerning the judiciary, the slightly amended 
versions that passed soon after, and a myriad of later amendments.73 
The following summary relies considerably on the June 2018 reports 
from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers and  GRECO’s March and June 2018 reports. These reports  
 
i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015 [Elections to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of 
Poland 2015] (2015), http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_wyniki_sejm [https://perma.cc/
7JSC-FSX7]. 
72.  European Commission Press Release IP/17/5367, Rule of Law: European Commission 
Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland (Dec. 20, 2017), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6NNL-K4NR]. 
73.  For detailed information through the fall of 2017, see Dariusz Mazur & Waldemar 
Żurek, So Called “Good Change” in the Polish System of the Administration of Justice, 
https://www.jura.unibonn.de/fileadmin/Fachbereich_Rechtswissenschaft/Einrichtungen/Lehrst
uehle/ Sanders/Dokumente/Good_change_-_7_October_2017_-_word.pdf, (last visited Jan. 31, 
2019); see also infra Part II.D and sources cited there. 
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are recent assessments by outside bodies following on-site reviews.74 
This Part provides an overview of the state of play at the end of summer 
2018.  For more recent events, see sources cited in II.C on reports by 
international, European, and nongovernmental bodies, some of which 
were issued in late 2018.  As Professor Wojciech Sadurski cautions, 
though, it is important to recognize regarding post-2015 changes to the 
Polish legal system that “the sum is more than its parts.”75 One must 
look at the “comprehensiveness and the cumulative effect” of the 
changes in Poland, the “functional connections” of the “individual 
elements.”76 
 
74. UN Special Rapporteur on Judicial Independence, Diego Garcia-Sayan (Comm’r for 
Human Rights of the Republic of Pol.), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence 
of Judges and Lawyers on his Mission to Poland, U.N. DOC.A/HRC/38/38/Add.1 (April 5, 2018) 
[hereinafter UNSR]; supra note 1 and accompanying text (information about GRECO); 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, GROUP OF STATES AGAINST CORRUPTION [GRECO], FOURTH 
EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, 
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. ADDENDUM TO THE SECOND COMPLIANCE REPORT–- POLAND 
(2018) 11, available at https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-
respect-of-members-of/16808b7688 [https://perma.cc/48YQ-2GZT] [hereinafter GRECO June 
2018]; GRECO, AD HOC REPORT ON POLAND (RULE 34) (2018) 1, available at 
https://rm.coe.int/ad-hoc-report-on-poland-rule-34-adopted-by-greco-at-its-79th-plenary-
m/168079c83c [https://perma.cc/HW46-WBW6] [hereinafter GRECO March 2018]. The March 
and June 2018 GRECO reports are under an ad hoc procedure that can be triggered when 
GRECO has reliable information that a member State may be “in serious violation of a council 
of Europe anti-corruption standard.” See GRECO, Ad Hoc Procedures (Rule 34), available at 
https://www.coe.int/en/web890recoo/ad-hoc-procedure-rule-34-[https://perma.cc/3YWP-
NLG]. In addition to these reports on Poland, GRECO published a 2012 evaluation report, 
GRECO, FOURTH EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS 
OF PARLIAMENT, JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. EVALUATION REPORT–- POLAND (2012), 
available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?
documentId=09000016806c7b1d [https://perma.cc/PYW5-EZ84] [hereinafter GRECO 2012 
Report], a 2014 compliance report, GRECO, FOURTH EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION 
PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. 
COMPLIANCE REPORT–- POLAND (2014), available at https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806c7b
20 [https://perma.cc/TAL5-GUZK], and a 2017 compliance report, GRECO, FOURTH 
EVALUATION ROUND: CORRUPTION PREVENTION IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, 
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS. SECOND COMPLIANCE REPORT – POLAND (2017), available at 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680702abf [https://perma.cc/
943E-TWKT]. 
75.  Sadurski, supra note 9, at 5.  
76.  Id. at 5, 17-45 (detail on the “capture and transformation” of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, assault on the “regular” judiciary, and the law on the Public Prosecutor’s office as 
well as their interconnectedness), 70 (“the small details . . . which jointly render the picture 
diametrically different from that mandated by the constitution”). 
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a. Merging the Minister of Justice and the General Prosecutor 
One of the PiS government’s first initiatives, adopted in January 
2016 and in force from March 2016, was the merger of the Office of 
the Public Prosecutor General with the Minster of Justice.77 Zbigniew 
Ziobro, the current Minister of Justice, also held that office in the 2005-
07 PiS government. When the PO government assumed power, they 
took the first steps toward a procedure before the Polish Tribunal of 
State that could have resulted in criminal and non-criminal sanctions 
against Ziobro.78 The Parliament eventually desisted in pursuing 
charges against Ziobro.79 Then Prime Minister Donald Tusk said he did 
not consider it appropriate for the governing party to  institute criminal 
proceedings against leaders of the opposition party.80 In 2010, however, 
the PO coalition government split the Prosecutor General function from 
the Minster of Justice with the stated purpose of reducing the possibility 
of political influence in prosecutions. 
Under the 2016 remerger of the functions, the Minister of Justice 
has not only supervisory powers over the organization of prosecution 
but also authority to intervene in particular prosecutions and give 
orders to the inferior prosecutors regarding their action in prosecutions. 
This creates the possibility of directly or indirectly influencing the 
outcome of cases. An American might question why this is problematic 
in that the US Attorney’s Office, which houses federal prosecutors, 
functions within the Department of Justice. The US Attorney General, 
unlike the combined Polish Minister of Justice and Prosecutor, has little 
role in who becomes a judge in the United States and how judges fare 
in their careers while the extensive post-2015 legislative changes in 
Polish law give the Polish Minister of Justice extensive control of most 
aspects of a judge’s career.81  Hence, the Polish Minister of Justice has 
 
77.  See id. at para. 14; GRECO June 2018, supra note 74. 
78.  Maxim Tomoszek, Politizace Institutu Ustavní Odpovědnosti Jako Jedna z Příčin 
Současné Ustavní Krize v Polsku, [Transformation of Constitutional Accountability into 
Political Weapon as One of the Causes of the Current Constitutional Crisis in Poland?], 
2 ČASOPIS PRO PRÁVNÍ VĚDU A PRAXI 241, 247-50 (2017) (concluding that Ziobro’s tenure as 
minister and prosecutor general from 2005-07 evidenced abuse of power for political gains, 
describing a highly visible and highly publicized raid on the home of politician Barbara Blida 
resulting in her death, and discussing the charges against Ziobro in the impeachment and 
constitutional accountability proceedings). 
79.  Id. at 251. 
80.  Id. at 252. 
81.  STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION & EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, WHERE THE 
LAW ENDS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN POLAND - AND WHAT TO DO 8-12 
(2018), available at http://citizensobservatory.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ESI-Batory-
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extensive power over both those who prosecute and those who hear the 
cases prosecuted. 
Under recent legislative changes regarding the court system, the 
Minister of Justice has considerably expanded power in such matters 
as selection of court presidents and judicial discipline.82 The June 2018 
GRECO report refers to the merger of the office of Prosecutor General 
with the Minister of Justice as a factor giving “rise to particular concern 
in terms of its effects on the separation of powers and the independence 
of courts and judges.”83 
b. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
The UN Special Rapporteur (“UNSP”) devotes seventeen of the 
eighty-two paragraphs of his April 2018 report, which was presented 
in June 2018 to the UN Human Rights Council, to the CT saga of the 
Constitutional Tribunal (“CT” or “Tribunal”).84 The UNSP describes 
the PiS government’s actions with regard to the judiciary as having two 
phases, the first being “bringing the Constitutional Tribunal under its 
control.”85 Mr. García-Sayán concludes from his detailed report on 
moves against the CT that the government was able to reduce the CT 
to a “politically pliant body” and that enabled moving on to other parts 
of the judiciary.86 The UNSP concludes that the “legitimacy and 
independence” of the Tribunal are now so undermined as to “cast 
serious doubts over its capacity to protect constitutional principles and 
to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms.”87 The UNSP 
report focuses on three clusters of action versus the CT: conflict over 
appointment of the justices including the Court President; refusal to 
 
Poland-and-the-end-of-the-Rule-of-Law-29-May-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VLE-QD2K] 
(tracing the ways the Minister of Justice can now exert significant control of  who becomes a 
judge, judicial education,  the trajectory of a judge’s career, the threat of discipline, and even 
extension of retirement age). 
82.  See, e.g., infra notes 104-107, 132-135 and accompanying text. 
83.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 56. 
84.  Mr. Diego García-Sayán, Special Rapporteur, Presentation on the Independence of 
Magistrates and Lawyers at the 38th Session of the Human Rights Council (June 22, 2018), 
available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/38/38/Add.1 
[https://perma.cc/U6ZU-FS8R]; STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION & EUROPEAN STABILITY 
INITIATIVE, supra note 81, at 4-6 (discussing the events regarding the Constitutional Tribunal). 
85.  UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 15. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. at para. 73. 
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publish and implement CT rulings; and adoption of “‘remedial statutes’ 
aimed at crippling the Tribunal’s effectiveness.”88 
In October 2015, the PO-led government appointed five judges to 
replace five retiring judges.89 A subsequent CT ruling held that this 
Parliament had the right to appoint three of the judges, but the 
expiration date of the terms for the other two made this action by the 
PO-government illegal.90 Nonetheless, President Duda refused to 
swear in any of the  five judges.91 The new PiS-controlled government 
appointed five new judges and passed a resolution purporting to nullify 
the appointments of the PO-appointed five.92 For a period, there were 
three “double-judges”—the three PO appointments ruled by the CT to 
be legitimate and three others made by the PiS government. 
The subsequent tangle of events included December 2015, March 
2016, and December 2016 amendments to legislation on CT operation, 
parts of which were declared unconstitutional by the CT in March and 
August 2016.93 The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe94 
adopted opinions saying that the Polish Parliament’s actions reached 
beyond their legislative authority requiring only a simple majority to 
constitutional changes requiring a two-thirds majority, which the ruling 
government does not have.95 
A new President of the CT was appointed with a procedure 
deemed questionable by the Venice Commission.96 The saga also 
includes the government’s refusal to accept the validity of some CT 
judgments and publish those opinions.97 After extreme criticism, 
 
88.  Id. at para. 22. 
89.  Piotr Czarny, Der Streit um den Verfassungsgerichtshof in Polen 2015-2016 [The 
Struggle over the Constitutional Court in Poland 2015-2016], 64 OSTEUROPARECHT 5, 6 (2018); 
Andrzej Dziadzio, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Die Auseinandersetzung um den 
Verfassungsgerichtshof in Polen (2015-2016) [Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? The 
Conflict over the Constitutional Court in Poland (2015-2016)], 64 OSTEUROPARECHT 21, 30 
(2018). 
90.  Czarny, supra note 89, at 7. 
91.  Dziadzio, supra note 89, at 26. 
92.  Czarny, supra note 89, at 17. 
93.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 12. 
94.  The European Commission for Democracy through Law (commonly called the Venice 
Commission) is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters. See THE 
VENICE COMM’N OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., For democracy through law, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation [https://perma.cc/W8NH-
3J47].  
95.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 12. 
96.  GRECO March 2018, supra note 74, at paras. 11, 13. 
97.  UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 35. 
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including that of the Venice Commission, for “pick[ing] and choos[ing] 
which judgments of a court are to be published,” the government 
published twenty-one judgments with a notation they were in “breach 
of the provisions of the act of the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June 
2015” and persisted in its refusal to publish other opinions, saying they 
were based on “normative acts that had ‘ceased to have effect.’” 98 
 c. The Polish Supreme Court 
Unfortunately, little of the complexity and nuance of post-2015 
changes in Polish law and legal system makes its way into the US 
mainstream press. On July 4, 2018, however, the front page of the New 
York Times featured a large photograph of thousands of Poles in front 
of the Supreme Court in Warsaw protesting the forced retirement of 
twenty-seven of the seventy-two Polish Supreme Court judges, 
including the First President, Małgorzata Gersdorf. A new law on the 
Supreme Court lowered the retirement age from seventy to sixty-five, 
including for sitting judges whose terms had not expired.99 Affected 
judges could apply to the President for extension, but more than a dozen 
affected, including Judge Gersdorf, declined to do so, saying that their 
removal from office before completion of their terms was 
unconstitutional. Judge Gersdorf vowed to continue coming to work, 
saying that, shortening of her term both as First President and as a judge 
while still in office was unconstitutional.100  The post-July events 
triggered by the attempted retirement of sitting Supreme Court judges 
are described in Subsection C of this Part. 
As summarized in the June 2018 GRECO report, other provisions 
of the new Supreme Court law have also been of considerable concern 
within Poland and to international bodies, particularly the creation of 
 
98.  Id. (government publication of the opinions under pressure from European institutions 
but with statement that the judgments are not valid); Ustawa o zmianie ustawy - Przepisy 
wprowadzające ustawę o organizacji i trybie postępowania przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym 
oraz ustawę o statusie sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Law of April 12, 2018 on 
Amending the Law Provisions Introducing the Law on Organization and Procedure at the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the Law on the Status on the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal] 
Dz. U. 2018 poz. 849, available at prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/
WDU20180000849/O/D20180849.pdf [https://perma.cc/99WF-YUE6] (Pol.). 
99.  Marc Santora, Poland Purges Its Supreme Court, and Protesters Take to the Streets, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/poland-
supreme-court-protest.html.  
100.  THEMIS ASSOCIATION OF JUDGES, Alarming Revolution within the Polish Supreme 
Court (July 2, 2018), http://themis-sedziowie.eu/materials-in-english/alarming-revolution-
within-the-polish-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/AQ9B-QDMH]. 
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two new chambers of the Supreme Court: one with new powers and 
procedures regarding disciplinary proceeding and another creation of 
the Chamber for Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs with 
jurisdiction over “extraordinary appeals” that could overturn existing 
court judgments.101 
The December 2017 Supreme Court Law makes many changes to 
the previous disciplinary process for Supreme Court judges. The judges 
in the disciplinary chamber are paid a forty percent higher salary,102 
and proceedings include participation of lay judges elected by the 
Senate.103 The Polish President and Minister of Justice are given 
considerable powers to direct the process.  The President may appoint 
a judge as an extraordinary disciplinary prosecutor, taken not only from 
the Supreme Court (as in the past), but also from the ordinary courts or 
military courts.104  If the disciplinary offense satisfies the elements of 
an intentional crime or intentional tax crime, the President also may 
appoint, instead of a judge, a prosecutor from  the staff of the highest 
level of the national prosecution office.105 Once such a disciplinary 
prosecutor is appointed, a disciplinary proceeding must commence.106 
If the President has knowledge of such crimes and does not appoint an 
extraordinary disciplinary prosecutor within thirty days, the Minister 
of Justice has the authority to notify the President that the Minister 
intends to appoint such a disciplinary prosecutor, and if the President 
does not act within thirty days, to do so.107  
The government also proposed legislation allowing reopening of 
past judgments without limitation to discovery of new facts.108 This 
generated much concern about retroactivity and stability of the legal 
order. Extraordinary appeals could be made by the Prosecutor General 
 
101.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 30.  
102.  Id. at para. 31 with Polish government response at note 16; Artykuł 48 ¶7 ustawy o 
Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5 [Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, 
¶7 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).  
103.  Artykuł 73 ¶1 pkt 1 & 2 ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 
poz. 5 [Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, ¶7.1 & 7.2 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).  
104.  Artykuł 76 ¶8 ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5 
[Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, ¶7 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.).  
105.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 31. 
106.  Id.  
107.  Artykuł 76 ¶9 ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5 
[Law on the Supreme Court, Art. 48, ¶7 (December 8, 2017)] (Pol.). 
108.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 31. 
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(Minister of Justice) and the Ombudsman.109 Lay judges would serve 
in these matters as well. 
GRECO’s June 2018 report concludes that concerns about these 
two new chambers are compounded “by the relatively large 
involvement of the executive in the internal proceedings of the SC,” 
including enhanced power in selecting the First President and 
presidents of chambers.110 GRECO recommended reconsideration of 
the establishment of the two new chambers and reduction in the 
executive’s involvement in the Supreme Court.111 The UNSR’s 
summary of concerns about these new chambers includes the 
jurisdiction of the Chamber for Extraordinary Control and Public 
Affairs with regard to “political sensitive cases” including electoral 
disputes and validation of elections and referendums.”112 
d. The National Council on the Judiciary 
As previously discussed, one compromise of the Solidarity 
Roundtable negotiations was the creation of a strong National Judiciary 
Council (“NJC”) to balance retention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and the military under the control of President Jaruzelski and the 
communist party.113 The April 1989 constitution provided for creation 
of the NJC.114 Implementing legislation in December 1989 stated the 
 
109.  Id. at para. 30, n.13. To respond, albeit in a limited way, to European criticism the 
Polish parliament narrowed the entities empowered to bring an “extraordinary appeal” after the 
GRECO report’s submission in April 2018. See Law on the System of Common Courts, the Act 
on the Supreme Court and Some Other Acts, art. 115 (May 10, 2018 amendment), available at 
https://www.infor.pl/aktprawny/DZU.2018.105.0001045,ustawa-o-zmianie-ustawy-prawo-o-
ustroju-sadow-powszechnych-ustawy-o-sadzie-najwyzszym-oraz-niektorych-innych-
ustaw.html [https://perma.cc/7CGX-BMGM]. 
110.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 33; see also UNSR, supra note 74, at 
paras. 59-62 (referring to the creation of these new chambers). 
111.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74 at paras. 31, 33, 35. 
112.  UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 62. 
113.  Grajewski, supra note 52; Friszke, supra note 52. 
114.  Artykuł 1 ustęp 17 Ustawy z dnia 07.04.1989 o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej 
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Dz. U. 1989, nr19 poz. 101 [Law on amending the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of Poland, Art. 1, section 17 (April 7, 1989)] (Pol.).   
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NJC’s mission to safeguard the independence of courts and judges.115 
This language is now part of the Polish constitution.116 
The current Polish constitution also provides that fifteen of the 
twenty-five members of the National Judiciary Council should be 
chosen from judges of the Supreme Court, common courts, 
administrative courts, and military courts.117 The remaining ten 
members are the First President of the Supreme Court, the Minister of 
Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, an 
appointee of the Polish President, and six members of Parliament (four 
elected by the Sejm and two by the Senate).118 
Since its creation, the NJC’s functions have included selecting 
candidates for positions for the first instance courts, appeals courts, and 
Supreme Court for a final decision by the Polish President.119 NJC 
powers also include filing motions with the Constitutional Tribunal 
regarding the constitutionality of laws on courts and judges, adopting 
the judicial code of ethics, and giving opinions on draft laws 
concerning the judiciary.120 
Until the December 2017 amendments to the Law on the National 
Council of the Judiciary, the fifteen judicial representatives were 
elected by various subparts of the judiciary.121 Those amendments 
changed the selection method for judicial members to election by the 
Sejm with a new procedure for their nomination.122 The new law also 
provided that the term for the fifteen current judge members would end 
 
115.  Artykuł 1 ustęp 2 ustawy z dnia 20.12.1989 o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa, Dz.U. 
1989, nr 73 poz. 435 [Law on National Judiciary Council, art. 1, sec. 2 (December 20, 1989)] 
(Pol.).   
116.  Artykuł 186 ustęp 1 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 02.04.1997 
[Republic of Poland Const. art. 186., sec. 1 (April 2, 1997)] (National Judiciary Council as 
guardian of court and judicial independence) (Pol.).   
117.  Artykuł 187 ustęp 1 pkt 2 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 02.04.1997 
[Republic of Poland Const. Art. 187, section 1.2, (April 2, 1997)] (composition and mode of 
election of the National Judiciary Council] (Pol.).  
118.  Id.  
119.  GRECO March 2018, supra note 74, at para. 24. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Artykuł 11 ustawy z dnia 12.05.2011 o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa, (Dz.U) nr 
126 pos 714, 5.12.2011  [Law on the National Council of the Judiciary, Chapter 1 Gen. Regs., 
(May 12, 2011)] (Pol.). From their membership, the Polish Supreme Court elected two 
representatives, the Supreme Administrative Court two; two from the Circuit Court of Appeals 
judges; one from the Military Courts, and eight elected by the local assemblies of the full court 
system. One rationale the PiS government has used for the change in selection of judicial 
members of the NJC was underrepresentation of the judges from the lowest courts. See GRECO 
June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 26. 
122.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 26. 
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in February 2018 regardless of where they were in the four-year terms 
provided in Article 187 of the Constitution.123 
The PiS government does not have a sufficient majority to change 
the Polish constitution. The Polish Ombudsman and the Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights are among those challenging the law 
changing the method of selection of the judges as unconstitutional.124 
Given a boycott by most of the judiciary, only eighteen judges 
stood for election for the fifteen slots.125 Most were judges who had 
been working in the Ministry of Justice on secondment.126 The GRECO 
June 2018 conclusion is that “effectively 21 of the 25 members of the 
NJC are now elected by Parliament (a majority of which by the ruling 
party).”127 GRECO cites their standard that at least half of the members 
of a National Judiciary Council should be elected by judges from their 
peers.128 
 e. The Ordinary Courts 
Acting under a new law on the ordinary courts in July 2017, the 
Minister of Justice quickly moved to dismiss 160 presidents and vice-
 
123.  Id. at para. 27. 
124.  Commissioner for Citizen’s Rights, Opinion of the Commissioner for the Draft 
Amendment to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, RPO (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/opinia-rpo-do-projektu-nowelizacji-ustawy-o-krajowej-
radzie-s%C4%85downictwa [https://perma.cc/8RWN-PM92]; HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, The Proposed Changes to the National Judiciary Council Violate the 
Constitution - The HFHR Opinion, HFHR (July 12, 2017), http://www.hfhr.pl/projektowane-
zmiany-w-krs-naruszaja-konstytucje-opinia-hfpc/ [https://perma.cc/Q2KB-NK6A].  This 
background section focuses on entities outside the Polish government, e.g., the European Union, 
international organizations, and nongovernmental entities that have documented and challenged 
governmental changes to the judicial system as well as the activities of the judges themselves. 
The current Polish Ombudsman, Adam Bodnar, was appointed by the previous government in 
September 2015. His office’s prodigious efforts regarding the judiciary are beyond the scope of 
this article. They were recognized by the Norwegian Rafto Foundation with their 2018 Laureate 
Human Rights Defender award, see RAFTO FOUNDATION, The 2018 Rafto prize to Ombudsman 
Adam Bodnar, https://www.rafto.no/news/the-2018-rafto-prize-to-ombudsman-adam-bodnar 
[https://perma.cc/GJ5A-JFE5]; Camilla Knudsen, Polish Ombudsman Wins Norwegian Human 
Rights Award, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-
norway/polish-ombudsman-wins-norwegian-human-rights-award-idUSKCN1M718A 
[https://perma.cc/6FQ4-4WCA] (pointing out that four past Rafto laureates, later won the Nobel 
Peace Prize).  
125.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 27. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at para. 29. 
128.  Id. 
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presidents of courts below the Supreme Court, “ordinary courts.”129 
Affected judges were given no reason or opportunity to appeal.130 The 
retirement age for judges was lowered.131 The Ministry of Justice was 
given the power to extend service beyond retirement analogous to the 
power given to the President with regard to the Supreme Court.132 
GRECO comments that the expanded power of the Minister of Justice 
should be seen in context of this office having assumed the functions 
of the Prosecutor General and the increase in the powers of this 
office.133 Those expanded powers include selecting judges for 
disciplinary courts for all ordinary court judges and the disciplinary 
commissioners who act as prosecutors.134 
While recognizing a legitimate role for a Justice Minister in court 
administration in matters like budgeting, the GRECO team that visited 
Poland in May 2018 expressed concern about the risk of “overreach” 
in the current system given the “extensive powers on the executive 
(who is at the same time the Prosecutor General).”135 
2. The PiS Vision of Law and Justice 
Following the 2015 election, PiS immediately moved to 
implement its concept of “law and justice,” the English translation of 
the party’s name Prawo i Sprawiedliwość.136 Before turning to post-
2015 PiS government actions with regard to the judicial system, this 
Subsection reviews PiS statements on the party’s view of  law and 
justice. 
The 2005 “Trawny case” on return of Polish property to a by-then-
German citizen was prominently in the press at the time and is still 
 
129.  Id. at para. 45. For a report of the process of these dismissals and their aftermath, 
see HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IT STARTS WITH THE PERSONNEL: 
REPLACEMENT OF COMMON COURT PRESIDENTS AND VICE PRESIDENTS FROM AUGUST 2017 
TO FEBRUARY 2018 (2018), available at www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/It-starts-
with-the-personnel.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA6B-FR9C].   
130.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 45. 
131.  Id. at para. 41. 
132.  Id. at para. 41. 
133.  Id. at para. 42. 
134.  Id. at para. 50.; Artykuł 110(a) ¶1 and 112 ¶3 ustawy prawo o ustroju sądów 
powszechnych from 27.7.2001, Dz. U. 2001, nr 98, poz. 1070 [Law on the Ordinary Courts, Art. 
110(a), ¶1 and 112 ¶3 (July 27, 2001)] (Pol.); Tekst jednolity z dnia 14 grudnia 2018, Dz. U. 
2019 poz. 52 [Consolidated text, Official Journal 2019, position 52 (Dec. 14, 2018)] (Pol.). 
135.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 51. 
136.  Infra subsection II.B.2. 
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referred to by PiS Party Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński.137 Kaczyński’s 
comments on the matter were early salvos in what later became a full-
scale attack on the Polish court system.138 Ms. Trawny was a Polish 
citizen living in the Mazury region of Poland in the mid-1970s.139 She 
moved to Germany for better economic opportunity, was divested of 
her Polish citizenship by Polish government, and divested of her 
property in Poland.140 Ms. Trawny became a German citizen in the 
1970s.141 In the mid-2000s, she sought return of her property in the 
Polish courts.142 The Polish Supreme Court affirmed a lower court 
decision holding her loss of citizenship illegal and returning some 
property in the Mazury region to Ms. Trawny, hence requiring the Poles 
occupying the property to leave.143 The Court also awarded 
compensation for additional property that could not be returned.144 
Kaczyński criticized the decision, saying, “In the post-German 
property cases, the courts should observe the Polish raison d’État and 
the Polish national interest.”145 Recently Kaczyński has labelled judges 
 
137.  For background on the Trawny case and Jarosław Kaczyński’s recent comments on 
it, see Za co Kaczyński zaatakował sędziów w Olsztynie, [Instead Kaczyński Attacked the 
Judges], WYBORCZA.PL (September 24, 2018, 4:45 PM),  http://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/
olsztyn/7,48726,23958052,za-to-kaczynski-zaatakowal-sedziow-w-olsztynie.html.  
138.  Jarosław Kaczyński: German claim due to Polish policy of apologizing, WPROST 
(May 17, 2008, 7:04 PM), https://www.wprost.pl/129945/J-Kaczynski-niemieckie-roszczenie-
efektem-polityki-przepraszania.html [https://perma.cc/3Q53-M4GD]. 
139.  Polish court evicts families from house owned by German, DW (Dec. 11, 2009), 
https://www.dw.com/en/polish-court-evicts-families-from-house-owned-by-german/a-4912979 
[https://perma.cc/VBY3-3WZN]. 
140.  Id.  
141.  Id.  
142.  Id. 
143.  Judgement of the Polish Supreme Court from the 13th of December 2005, IV CK 
304/05 (Pol.); Julika Makaro, Swoi i obcy w dyskursie prasowym na przykładzie wypowiedzi 
prasowych dotyczących Agnes Trawny, [“We” and “They” in the press discourse by the example 
of press statements concerning Agnes Trawny], 1 STUDIA MIGRACYJNE – PRZEGLĄD 
POLONIJNY at 55 (2016). 
144.  Makaro, supra note 143, at 56.  
145.  The Polish Supreme Court decided two cases in Ms. Trawny’s favor: return of the 
property confiscated by the communists and compensation for the usage of her property without 
title. This generated numerous critical statements from the PiS as well as other parties like the 
SLD – Alliance of the Democratic Left. Jest odwołanie od wyroku w sporze z Agnes Trawny, 
[Appeal from judgment in dispute regarding Agnes Trawny], LEX (July 6, 2018, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/jest-odwolanie-od-wyroku-w-sporze-z-agnes-trawny 
[https://perma.cc/ME9M-CVWT]; Wyrok ws. Agnes Trawny źle swiadczy o polskich sądach” 
[The Agnes Trawny verdict shows what is wrong with the Polish courts”], WP WIADOMOŚCI 
(Dec. 18, 2009, 11:45 AM), https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wyrok-ws-agnes-trawny-zle-swiadczy-o-
polskich-sadach-6032760428679809a [https://perma.cc/KV43-9D8R]. On the famous comment 
of J. Kaczyński, see SN uchylił wyrok ws. majątku “późnych przesiedleńców,” [The Supreme 
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who would decide in this way as ojkofobic, harboring a hatred of their 
native country.146 PiS Party Chairman Kaczyński has often stated his 
view that judges  should be a part of the apparatus of the state, fulfilling 
the political objectives of the ruling majority, identified with the 
interests of the state.147 In Kaczyński’s eyes, observance of the law 
should not justify a judicial decision if it differs from the interest of the 
nation.148 This explains the name of the party: Law and Justice. In this 
name, justice questions the value of the law by exalting other more 
metaphysical categories, which are necessary to legitimize the law. The 
justice component takes on a nationalist perspective—the law cannot 
produce effects against the interest of the nation, as defined by the 
governing party. With comments on the Trawny case, Kaczyński also 
seeks to reactivate anti-German resentments in Poland,149 as a kind of 
Euro-skeptical vehicle for political purposes. The courts and judges are 
also the victims of such perception of the law and political goals.      
 
Court overturned the verdict on the property of „late displaced persons”], LEX (July 15, 2010), 
www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/sn-uchylil-wyrok-ws-majatku-poznych-przesiedlencow 
[https://perma.cc/S36V-NGPN]; see also Andrzej Mężyński, Kaczyński: Niech Tusk Odkupi 
Ziemię od Niemców, [Kaczyński: Let Tusk by the land from the Germans], DZIENNIK.PL (June 
7, 2010, 4:16 PM), wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/artykuly/71466,kaczynski-niech-tusk-
odkupi-ziemie-od-niemcow.html [https://perma.cc/9XZA-BKZF].   
146.  Magdalena Nowicka-Franczak, Niemiłość narodowa [National Non-Love], 1 
TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, at 87 (2019); Za co Kaczyński zaatakował sędziów w Olsztynie, 
[What Kaczyński attacked the judges for in Olsztyn], WYBORCZA.PL (Sept. 24, 2018, 4:45 PM), 
http://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/olsztyn/7,48726,23958052,za-to-kaczynski-zaatakowal-sedziow-w-
olsztynie.html.  
147.  On October 17, 2018, GAZETA WYBORCZA published a special issue of their 
newspaper called Czarna księga:  trzech lat rządów PiS [The Black Book: Three Years of PiS 
Rule].  See Black is Black. PiS’s Black Book of Government and Konstytucja poster on 
Wednesday with Wyborcza, WYBORCZA.PL (October 12, 2018, 2:16 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/
7,95791,24031318,czarna-ksiega-rzadow-pis-w-srode-z-wyborcza.html. The Black Book has 
thirty-two chapters addressing various aspects of the country’s situation, published among 
borders with a timeline of events. While the entire issue is not available for download, Chapter 
2 by University of Warsaw professor Marcin Matczak, which describes PiS’s philosophy of 
government and actions with regard to the courts, is available at Marcin Matczak, The end of  
separation of powers, WYBORCZA.PL (Oct. 17, 2018, 12:57 AM), http://wyborcza.pl/
7,166575,24049890,koniec-trojpodzialu-wladzy.html https://perma.cc/AD3E-UYPR].  
148.  Id. (discussing the flaw in equating a “party leader’s intuition” with a determination 
of the nation’s will) (available in Polish, translated by Frydeyrk Stanisław Zoll).  
149.  On the symbolic relevance of the Agnes Trawny case in the Polish internal debate on 
the proprietary relationships related to the previous German population of the former German 
territories, irrespective of the fact that the Trawny case is rather specific and not representative 
of the majority of the Polish-German proprietary relationships, see Julita Makaro, Swoi i obcy w 
dyskursie prasowym na przykładzie wypowiedzi prasowych dotyczących Agnes Trawny [“We” 
and “They” in the press discourse by the example of press statements concerning Agnes 
Trawny], 1 STUDIA MIGRACYJNE – PRZEGLĄD POLONIJNY, at 56-66 (2016). 
902 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
This seed of unhappiness with the court system blossomed 
fulsomely in the PiS 2009 Program section on “legal impossibilism,” a 
concept often invoked by PiS Party Chair Kaczyński and others in the 
PiS party. 150 The 2009 program defines the legal impossibilism as “the 
programmatic inability of the State to undertake many actions 
necessary for the protection of its interests and the wellbeing of its 
citizens.”151 In addition to limiting things the state “needs to do,” the 
concept also is described as “petrifying a post-communist status quo,” 
meaning collusion among government officials and business people 
who profit from the collusion.152 The program says that the “ideology 
and practice” of legal impossibilism not only “helps to maintain post-
communist social relationships but also results from the reluctance of 
some Polish elites to have a strong state.”153 The program elaborates, 
saying that Poland, in wishing to avoid the totalitarianism of the past, 
now has a government with “excessive restriction of the democratic 
state’s actions to benefit its citizens” and an “over-idealistic 
understanding of the division and balance of power among the branches 
of government.”154 The program describes “the hyperactivity of the 
Constitutional Tribunal” as one of the manifestations of 
impossibilism.155 The program decries court decisions that overturn  
 
150.  PRAWO I SPRAWIEDLIWOŚĆ, PIS 2009 PROGRAM (2009), http://old.pis.org.pl/
dokumenty.php?s=partia&iddoc=148 [https://perma.cc/7P42-N74A] (last visited July 31, 2018) 
(available in Polish, translated by Co-author Zoll). Kaczyński uses “Impossibilismus” as a 
combat term to undermine democracy in Poland. See Christian Esch, Ich Bin das Volk: Ein 
Autoritärer Herrschaftstypus Verändert die Welt. Wie Erklärt Sich der Erfolg von Putin, Trump, 
Erdoğan, Xi? Die Spiegel-Titelstory, SPIEGEL (June 8, 2018, 3:39 PM) http://www.spiegel.de/
plus/xi-jinping-wladimir-putin-donald-trump-erdogan-ich-bin-das-volk-a-00000000-0002-000
1-0000-000157769149 [https://perma.cc/6EVC-NS2L]; Marc Santora, The Roots of Poland’s 
Defiance of the European Union, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2017),  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
12/25/world/europe/poland-eu-judicial-laws.html; Roger Cohen, Opinion, How Democracy 
Became the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018), www.nytimes.com/2018/04/06/opinion/sunday/
orban-hungary-kaczynski-poland.html (terming legal impossibilism as the counterbalancing 
power vested in an independent constitutional judiciary); see Matczak, supra note 147 on PiS’s 
views on impossibilism. 
151.  PIS 2009 PROGRAM, supra note 150, at 13. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. at 14. 
154.  Id; see also Michael Meyer-Resende, Is Europe’s Problem Illiberal Majoritarianism 
or Creeping Authoritarianism?, CARNEGIE EUROPE, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/06/13/is-
europe-s-problem-illiberal-majoritarianism-or-creeping-authoritarianism-pub-76587 
[https://perma.cc/4XC9-HY8A]. 
155.  PIS 2009 PROGRAM, supra note 150, at 14. 
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“acts expressing the will of the majority and the result of the arduous 
work of democratically-elected state bodies.”156 
Since taking power in 2015, PiS government officials describe the 
objectives of court “reform” in neutral terms like enhanced efficiency 
and accountability, combined with allusions to corruption and lingering 
communist taint.157 Generally, government officials no longer refer to 
removing judicial obstacles to the government’s policy initiatives and 
to PiS’s view of the country’s best interests.158 In a July 2018 interview, 
however, PiS Party Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński said, “The European 
Commission will not break the Polish will to complete the reform, 
because it is either-or. If the judiciary is not reformed, other reforms 
have little sense, because sooner or later they will be through such 
courts as we have, negated, withdrawn.”159 Here, he explicitly says that 
success in the PiS government’s initiatives, presumably including such 
matters as the manner of election to the European Parliament, the law 
governing public demonstrations, control of public media, compliance 
 
156.  Id. 
157.  See generally The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of 
the Polish Judiciary (2018), available at https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/white_paper_
en_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7P7-J3BG]; Mateusz Morawiecki (Opinion), WASHINGTON 
EXAMINER, (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/prime-minister-mateusz-
morawiecki-why-my-government-is-reforming-polands-judiciary/article/2643279 
[https://perma.cc/PYB4-37RX]. For a detailed response to the Polish government’s White Paper 
by Iustitia, one of the two major Polish judges’ associations, see Iustitia’s March 16, 2018 paper 
and supplement: Response to the White Paper Compendium on the Reforms of the Polish Justice 
System, IUSTITIA (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.iustitia.pl/informacje/2172-response-to-the-
white-paper-compendium-on-the-reforms-of-the-polish-justice-system-presented-by-the-
government-of-the-republic-of-poland-to-the-european-commission [https://perma.cc/222S-
3ZG5]. 
158.  PiS had learned some lessons from their 2005-07 time in power when initiatives were 
blocked in the courts. See INT’L BAR ASS’N HUM. RTS INST., JUSTICE UNDER SIEGE; A REPORT 
ON THE RULE OF LAW IN POLAND 5 (2007), available at https://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=06d75809-1dce-49e3-97f4-8de8d4d454ff 
[https://perma.cc/AT64-4P94] (report of a September 2007 fact-finding mission to Poland by 
the IBA’s Human Rights Institute and the Council of Bars & Law Societies of Europe in which 
they describe PiS as then “embark[ing] on a campaign to gain control over the entire judicial 
system”).  
159.  Dominika Sitnicka, Jarosław Kaczyński wyjawia całą prawdę o reformie 
sądownictwa  [Jarosław Kaczyński reveals the whole truth about teform of the judiciary], OKO 
PRESS (July 9, 2018), https://oko.press/jaroslaw-kaczynski-wyjawia-cala-prawde-reformie-
sadownictwa/ [https://perma.cc/H7LP-28EW]; In the New “Network”: A Unique Interview With 
the PiS President, SIECI PRAWDY (July 8, 2018), https://www.wsieciprawdy.pl/w-nowym-sieci-
wyjatkowy-wywiad-z-prezesem-pis-pnews-3668.html [https://perma.cc/LR7E-5FZ8] (“Jeśli 
nie zreformuje się sądownictwa, inne reformy mają mały sens, bo prędzej czy później zostaną 
przez takie sądy, jakie mamy, zanegowane, cofnięte”) (available in Polish, translated by Co-
author Zoll). 
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with environmental regulations, treatment of civil society 
organizations, and so on, depend on having courts compliant with the 
government’s wishes.160  
3. The PiS Campaign against the Judiciary 
Diego García-Sayán, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers (“Special Rapporteur”), visited 
Poland in October 2017 in preparation for a June 2018 presentation to 
the Human Rights Council of the UN General Assembly. His April 
2018 report, prepared for the June UN Human Rights Council session,  
describes the September 2017 “Fair Courts” campaign of the Polish 
National Foundation, an organization funded by seventeen state-owned 
companies “with the official aim of promoting large-scale reform of 
the judiciary.”161 The Special Rapporteur’s report describes the 
campaign’s billboards, television and social media advertisements, and 
dedicated portal as providing a “distorted image of the judiciary, 
depicting judges as ‘the enemy’ of Polish people and an evil in Polish 
society.”162 The Special Rapporteur characterized the effort as a “large-
scale propaganda attack against the judiciary, who are depicted by the 
ruling majority as a ‘caste,’ a ‘State within the State’, an entirely self-
governing corporation which aims solely at defending its interests and 
is not accountable to the society.”163 The Special Rapporteur describes 
the campaign as making “instrumental use of a few and isolated cases 
in which judges had been involved in illicit activities to demonize the 
judiciary as a whole.”164 
The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (“HFHR”) in Poland 
submitted a report to the Special Rapporteur during his October 2017 
visit. The HFHR report describes the Fair Courts campaign as a 
 
160.  Za co Kaczyński zaatakował sędziów w Olsztynie, [Instead Kaczyński Attacked the 
Judges], GAZETA WYBORCZA (Sept. 24, 2018, 16:45), http://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/olsztyn/
7,48726,23958052,za-to-kaczynski-zaatakowal-sedziow-w-olsztynie.html. 
161.  UNSR, supra note 74, at paras. 17-19. 
162.  UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 19. For a detailed response to the Fair Courts 
campaign’s allegations by the National Judiciary Council then still in office, see Kampania 
Billboardowa: a Prawda Jest Taka [The Billboard Campaign: And the Truth is This], KRAJOWA 
RADA SĄDOWNICTWA, http://krs.pl/pl/rzecznik-prasowy/a-prawda-jest-taka [https://web.
archive.org/web/20180418050443/http://krs.pl/pl/rzecznik-prasowy/a-prawda-jest-taka], cited 
in ANNA WÓJCIK, FREEDOM HOUSE, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2018 - POLAND 13 (2018), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NiT2018_Poland_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R79F-
LHKU]. 
163.  UNSR, supra note 74, at para. 19. 
164.  Id. 
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response to the Free Courts slogan of the July 2017 massive Polish 
street protests regarding the judiciary.165 They report the Polish 
National Foundation spent almost PLN19 million (almost US$5.5 
million) on the campaign.166 On October 31, 2017, the Polish television 
channel TVN24 reported that the Polish National Foundation had 
retained the Washington D.C. consulting firm, White House Writers 
Group, for an English-language campaign with five objectives 
including to  
Explain that the reform of the judiciary in Poland is crucial for the 
elimination of corruption, impunity and delays, which make access 
to justice difficult for thousands of Polish citizens every year. It is 
also designed to restore the checks and balances, eliminated by the 
Soviet-style judiciary, which the newly independent Poland 
inherited over a quarter of a century ago.167 
The information reported came from the Foreign Agent 
Registration Act (“FARA”) filing made by the D.C. firm, which 
included the contract with the Polish National Foundation at a rate of 
US$45,000 per month plus reasonable expenses up to ten percent of the 
fee with a three-month advance.168  On December 31, 2018, the Polish 
National Foundation filed the 2016 and 2017 substantive and financial 
activity reports, which Polish law requires with regard to 
foundations.169 The reports confirmed nearly half of the Foundation’s 
2017 budget was spent on the campaign.170 
As in the 2009 platform, PiS officials continue referring to a 
communist taint allegedly hanging over the judiciary. For example, in 
an April 2017 interview, Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro, said: 
 
165.  HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN POLAND 
– ATTACKS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION 33 (2017). 
166.  Id. 
167.  The Polish National Foundation to Launch its “Fair Courts” Campaign Abroad, 
TVN24 (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:39 AM), https://www.tvn24.pl/tvn24-news-in-english,157,m/the-
polish-national-foundation-to-launch-its-fair-courts-campaign-abroad,786067.html. 
[https://perma.cc/J4TB-CALZ]. 
168.  Id. 
169.  8,4 mln złotych na "Sprawiedliwe Sądy", pół miliona na pensje zarządu. Znamy 
finanse PFN [8.4 million zlotys for “Fair Courts,” half a million for the board’s salaries. We 
know PFN’s finances], TVN24 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polska,108/8-4-mln-
zlotych-na-sprawiedliwe-sady-pol-miliona-na-pensje-zarzadu-znamy-finanse-pfn,897127.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8D8-2Z6C] (including reporting on conflicting statements on the PNF’s 
relationship to the government, investigations and court decisions on legal issues related to the 
campaign). 
170.  Id. 
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The judiciary had 25 years to purify itself and elaborate conduct 
standards. And, they have done nothing so they lost their 
opportunity. Today the democratically-elected politicians need to 
change it. Repair of the judicial system is the most important issue 
for which the voters elected us. I will not retreat in the battle for 
justice and fairness in Poland, and I will fulfil the program whose 
objective is that the justice system is more protective of honest 
people.171 
In a December 13, 2017 opinion piece in a conservative on-line 
newsmagazine, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki charged 
that the Roundtable Talks allowed General Jaruzelski to “nominate an 
entirely new bench of Communist-era judges to staff the post-
communist courts.”172 In his study of post-communist judicial self-
government in Central and Eastern Europe, Czech scholar David Kosař 
refers to Poland as an exception to the region’s common pattern of 
“rebuild[ing] their judiciaries with essentially the same personnel” 
because “most judges of the Polish Supreme Court (not of the lower 
courts) were removed from office.”173 With the government transition 
in Poland having occurred almost thirty years ago, most lower court 
judges who were in office then likely have retired.174 
 
171.  Zbigniew Ziobro: Nie cofnę się w walce o sprawiedliwość, [Zbigniew Ziobro: I will 
not turn back in the fight for justice], WMP.PL PARLAMENTARNY, https://www.wnp.pl/
parlamentarny/ludzie/zbigniew-ziobro-nie-cofne-sie-w-walce-o-sprawiedliwosc,22183.html 
[https://perma.cc/E4T9-PNYR] (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (available in Polish, translated by 
Co-author Zoll). 
172.  Mateusz Morawiecki (Opinion), supra note 157; see supra notes 56 and 57 and 
accompanying text for numbers of Polish Supreme Court judges replaced. 
173.  Kosař¸ supra note 4, at 3 n.11. 
174.  The current heated climate on new Supreme Court appointments has included debate 
regarding PiS allegations that sitting Supreme Court judges made dishonorable decisions in the 
martial law period from 1981-1983. Premier o “haniebnych wyrokach”. Ilu sędziów Sądu 
Najwyższego orzekało w stanie wojennym? [Prime Minister About “shameful sentences”. How 
many Supreme Court judges ruled during martial law?], TVN24 (July 9, 2018, 8:04 AM), 
https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/ktorzy-sedziowie-sadu-najwyzszego-orzekali-w-
stanie-wojennym,851747.html [https://perma.cc/UXF9-JDRF]; “Pamiętam jeden wyrok”. 
Pozostałe “były ze swiadomością, że będzie amnestia” [“I remember one sentence”. The others 
“were aware that there would be an amnesty”], TVN24 (July 16, 2018, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/sedzia-jozef-iwulski-a-procesy-stanu-
wojennego,854167.html [https://perma.cc/3A5B-RA95]; Jacek Gądek, Józef Iwulski do dymisji. 
Jak najszybciej. Nie ma moralnego prawa być najważniejszym sędzią [Józef Iwulski to tesign as 
soon as possible. There is no moral right to be the most important judge], GAZETA.PL (July 17, 
2017, 4:20 PM), http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,161770,23683378,jacek-gadek-
sedzia-jozef-iwulski-do-dymisji-jak-najszybciej.html [https://perma.cc/8SQQ-4KG9]. 
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PiS also rails about corrupt judges, although their documents have 
provided very few examples.175 GRECO, in their Fourth Evaluation 
Round report in 2012, cited a Eurobarometer survey with thirty-two 
percent of Polish respondents saying corruption in the judiciary was 
widespread.176 GRECO noted that this is identical to the European 
average, expressed concern about public trust in the institution, and 
made recommendations directed toward improved public 
perception.177 The 2012 report notes that those to whom their team 
spoke—inside the government and out—“generally concurred that 
corruption within the judiciary was not a widespread phenomenon.”178 
In attempting to explain why the perception of corruption might be 
significantly higher than the reality, GRECO reported suggestions 
received during their site visit: weak understanding in the public of the 
legal system, lack of transparency,179 “hermetic” judicial disciplinary 
proceedings, and Poland’s broad form of judicial immunity.180 
C. Reports and Actions of International, European, and 
Nongovernmental Bodies regarding Polish Government Actions since 
2015 
While it may seem that the historic launching of the first EU 
Article 7 proceeding is the most momentous external event in the Polish 
judicial independence saga, the complementary functions of the other 
parts of this Subsection should be seen in conjunction with the Article 
7 proceeding. These are the Polish government actions that are now 
freed to go forward with neutered courts; the prodigious efforts by 
 
175.  See Iustitia’s response to Government White Paper, supra note 157.  
176.  GRECO 2012 Report, supra note 74, at para. 15. 
177.  Id. at para. 15 and 224, vii-xi. 
178.  Id. at 15; see also European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, Position Paper of 
the Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the KRS of Poland, para. 4.1, (August 16, 2018), 
available at https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-
encj2017-p/News/ENCJ%20Board%20position%20paper%20on%20KRS%20Poland.pdf (on 
the lack of evidence supporting the Polish government’s allegations of corruption and 
communist taint in the Polish judiciary).  
179.  Kosař¸ supra note 4, at 15 (commenting that civil law judicial systems generally are 
less transparent than those in common law countries). 
180.  GRECO 2012 Report, supra note 74, at para. 15, 224, vii-xi (GRECO 
recommendations for improvement regarding the asset declaration process and conflict of 
interest guidance, which seem directed toward improving the public perception of the judiciary 
rather than a GRECO finding of serious or widespread judicial corruption to be “rooted out”); 
see also supra notes 333-335 and accompanying text with the authors’ suggestions on reasons 
the public might be frustrated with the courts and identify corruption as the reason even if that 
were not the case. 
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nongovernmental and international organizations to document the 
constantly-changing situation in Poland; and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”) front, which has opened alongside the 
Article 7 proceeding. 
1. PiS Initiatives beyond Judicial “Reform” 
 
The November 2017 European Parliament (“EP”) resolution,181 
European Commission’s December 2017 Reasoned Proposal in 
accordance with  Article 7,182 and many reports and statements by 
major non-governmental organizations and regional and international 
entities describe issues beyond judicial independence that are of 
concern in Poland.183 These include a multi-front effort to destabilize 
non-governmental organizations and organize counter “government-
organized-governmental organizations;”184 government actions with 
regard to the public media;185 changes in criminal, police, civil service, 
 
181.  EUR. PARL. DOC. (P8_TA 2017/0442) (2017). 
182.  Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 835) (2017). The European 
Parliament had commenced a similar procedure but withdrew its application to avoid 
duplication. See European Parliament to Vote on ‘Nuclear Option’ Against Poland, 
EURACTIV (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/european-
parliament-to-vote-on-atomic-option-against-poland/ [https://perma.cc/392C-3XX9]; Alice 
Cuddy, What is ‘Article 7’ and Why Was it Triggered Against Poland?, EURONEWS (Dec. 20, 
2017), www.euronews.com/2017/12/20/what-is-article-7-and-why-was-it-triggered-against-
poland [https://perma.cc/TE8M-8UW2]; Rafał Badowski, Parlament Europejski wycofuje 
procedurę ws. artykułu 7, ale PiS i tak nie ma się z czego cieszyć [European Parliament is 
withdrawing the Article 7 procedure, but PiS is not happy about it anyway], NA:TEMAT (Poland), 
(Jan. 16, 2018), http://natemat.pl/227539,parlament-europejski-wycofuje-procedure-ws-
artykulu-7-ale-pis-i-tak-nie-ma-sie-z-czego-cieszyc [https://perma.cc/EJZ5-F8J9]. 
183.  Poland 2017/2018, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-
and-central-asia/poland/report-poland/ [https://perma.cc/6JWZ-GFAW] (last visite July 6, 
2018). 
184.  Poland’s Right-Wing Government Takes Steps to Control NGO Funding, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/polands-right-wing-government-takes-steps-
to-control-ngo-funding/a-40535610 [https://perma.cc/4JYV-PMCR]. 
185.  Jan Cieński, New Media Law Gives Polish Government Fuller Control, POLITICO 
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-crisis-constitution-kaczynski-duda/ 
[https://perma.cc/V3RB-6UE7]. 
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and counter-terrorism law;186 a law limiting the right of assembly;187 
Poland’s refusal to implement a European Court of Justice order on 
logging in a UNESCO World Heritage site and European Court of 
Human Rights issues regarding return of asylum-seekers to Belarus;188 
issues regarding women’s reproductive health;189 change in laws 
regarding domestic violence;190 media reports of police surveillance of 
opposition and civil society leaders;191 and the November 11, 2017 
march by far-right groups termed “xenophobic and fascist” by the 
November 15 European Parliament resolution.192  As described in 
Subsection II.C.2 on the PiS vision of law and justice, one of PiS’s 
founding tenets is frustration at court actions their leaders see as 
thwarting policies PiS deems to protect the interests of the Polish nation 
and its citizens.193 Many of the previously-listed initiatives presumably 
would be seen by PiS as such interests.  
 
186.  Ruaidhrí Giblin, High Court Judge Seeks EU Ruling on Effect of Polish Law 
Changes, THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-
law/courts/high-court/high-court-judge-seeks-eu-ruling-on-effect-of-polish-law-changes-
1.3424530 [https://perma.cc/6TX6-7XUU]. 
187.  Rick Lyman & Joanna Berendt, Protests Erupt in Poland Over New Law on Public 
Gatherings, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/europe/
poland-protests.html; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE POWER OF ‘THE STREET’: PROTECTING 
THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL PROTEST IN POLAND (2018), available at https://www.amnesty.be/
IMG/pdf/poland_report_final_for_upload.pdf [https://perma.cc/G85T-6T42].  
188.  Bistieva et al. v. Poland, App. No. 75157/14, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-182210 [https://perma.cc/T9K8-BBBS]; Arthur Neslen, Poland Violated EU Laws 
by Logging in Białowieża Forest, Court Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/poland-violated-eu-laws-by-logging-in-
biaowieza-forest-says-ecj [https://perma.cc/29R3-KF2N]. 
189.  Lydia Smith, Poland abortion ban: Thousands of women take to streets across 
country to demand reproductive rights, INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2018, 2:15 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-women-abortion-ban-march-strike-
protest-reproductive-rights-polish-government-latest-a8163281.html [https://perma.cc/FD6A-
PBQJ]. 
190.  Agnieszka Bielecka, Poland No Friend to Women, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 6, 
2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/03/poland-no-friend-women [https://
perma.cc/A3NU-83GD]. 
191.  Police target Opposition politicians and NGO activists, HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (July 6, 2018, 2:30 PM), www.hfhr.pl/en/police-target-opposition-politicians-
and-ngo-activists/ [https://perma.cc/4D4B-UYDW]. 
192.  EUR. PARL. DOC. (P8_TA 2017/0442) (2017), para. 18; Rule of law and democracy 
in Poland at risk: Parliament ready for next steps, EUR. PARL. (July 6, 2018, 2:35 PM), 
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171110IPR87824/rule-of-law-and-
democracy-in-poland-at-risk-parliament-ready-for-next-steps [https://perma.cc/6CGJ-MCK4]. 
193.  Supra notes 137-56 and accompanying text. 
910 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
2. Nongovernmental and International Organization 
Over the two years this Article was in process, many reports and 
statements by nongovernmental and international organizations reacted 
to the torrent of legislative change by the post-2015 Polish government, 
actions by the government’s political leaders, and changes the 
government’s new appointees in the judicial system started to take.194 
Some significant NGO reports are mentioned in the text, but the list is 
not comprehensive.195 The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 
(“HFHR”) in Poland submitted a thirty-three-page report on justice 
system issues during the October 2017 visit of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers.196 Also in 
October 2017, Human Rights Watch published Eroding Checks and 
Balances: Rule of Law and Human Rights Under Attack in Poland.197 
Amnesty International submitted Poland: Dismantling Rule of Law? to 
the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review in 
April/May 2017.198 As the title suggests, Human Rights First’s August 
2017 report, Poland’s New Front: A Government’s War Against Civil 
Society, focused in large part on actions regarding nongovernmental 
 
194.  See, e.g., Mikołaj Pietrzak, The Foundation for Law, Justice & Society, The 
Constitutional Court of Poland: The Battle for Judicial Independence (2017), 
https://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/The%20Constitutional%20Court%20
of%20Poland.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE78-AP6B] (describing new laws on public media, 
surveillance and antiterrorism, and “reorganization” of the prosecution system, which a 
neutering of the Constitutional Tribunal permitted); examples cited in supra notes 184-192 and 
accompanying text; Sadurski, supra note 9, at 49-55 (right of assembly, freedom of speech, 
counter-terrorism measures, electoral law).. 
195.  In addition to the reports mentioned in the text, see, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
supra note 187; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JUSTICE PURGED: POLAND POLITICIZES ITS JUDICIARY 
(June 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/justice-purged-poland-politicizes-its-
judiciary [https://perma.cc/Q3NS-H497]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLAND: UPDATE ON 
THE “REFORM” OF THE JUDICIARY, (Dec. 6, 2018) https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
eur37/9457/2018/en/ [https://perma.cc/9VND-3UQ2].  
196.  HELSINKI FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN POLAND: 
ATTACKS ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL (2017), available 
at http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HFHR_independence-of-justice-
system_October-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JYD-5PB6]; supra note 74 (report of the Special 
Rapporteur’s visit).  
197.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERODING CHECKS AND BALANCES: RULE OF LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK IN POLAND (2017), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/
2017/10/24/eroding-checks-and-balances/rule-law-and-human-rights-under-attack-poland 
[https://perma.cc/BBW9-MKE8]. 
198.  AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLAND, DISMANTLING RULE OF LAW? AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL SUBMISSION FOR THE UN UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW—27TH SESSION OF 
THE UPR WORKING GROUP, APRIL/MAY 2017,  available at  https://www.amnesty.org/
en/documents/eur37/5069/2016/en/ [https://perma.cc/T6FJ-44S2].  
2019] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 911 
organizations, in what the report describes as a “slide toward . . . 
illiberalism,” in the “dismantl[ing] of the country’s Constitutional 
Tribunal, ensuring that it is unable to check the power of the executive 
or legislature” as well as referring to other actions with regard to the 
justice system.199  The Stefan Batory Foundation issued a number of 
reports including a May 2018 report titled Where the law ends—The 
collapse of rule of law in Poland—and what to do,200 Report of the 
Stefan Batory Foundation Legal Expert Group on the impact of the 
judiciary reform in Poland in 2015-18,201 and Devastation of Poland’s 
Supreme Court and judicial independence: the situation now.202   
Poland is prominently featured in Freedom House’s report, Nations in 
Transit 2018, Confronting Illiberalism.203 Freedom House’s annual 
country reports, including their annual Democracy Score rating, 
featured concerns about the judiciary, and Freedom House also 
published Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s 
Courts.204 
The European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (“ENCJ”) 
issued numerous statements calling on the Polish executive and 
parliament to reconsider legislation the ENCJ deems would bring the 
Polish judiciary under the control of the political branches of 
 
199.  HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, POLAND’S NEW FRONT: A GOVERNMENT’S WAR AGAINST 
CIVIL SOCIETY (2017), available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/
Poland-Report-August-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW9L-FMFS]. 
200.  STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION, supra note 81.  
201.  STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION LEGAL EXPORT GROUP, REPORT OF THE STEFAN 
BATORY FOUNDATION LEGAL EXPERT GROUP ON THE IMPACT OF THE JUDICIARY REFORM IN 
POLAND IN 2015-2018 (2018), available at http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%
20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Batory%20Foundation_Report%20on%20the%20
judiciary%20reform%20in%20Poland.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6Q2-LZ75]. Co-Author Zoll is a 
member of the legal experts group.  
202.  MARIA EJCHART-DUBOIS, ET AL., STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION, DEVASTATION 
OF POLAND’S SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE SITUATION NOW (2018), 
available at http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Forum%20Idei/
Devastation%20of%20PL%20Supreme%20Court.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7C8-LV99]. 
203. NATE SCHENKKAN, FREEDOM HOUSE, NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2018: CONFRONTING 
ILLBERALISM (2018), available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-
transit-2018#key-findings. [https://perma.cc/W5WR-C9TF]. 
204.  ANNA WÓJCIK, FREEDOM HOUSE, POLAND (2018), available at https://
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/poland [https://perma.cc/5J6C-8HSX]; 
CHRISTIAN DAVIES, FREEDOM HOUSE, HOSTILE TAKEOVER: HOW LAW AND JUSTICE 
CAPTURED POLAND’S COURTS (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/hostile-
takeover-how-law-and-justice-captured-poland-s-courts [https://perma.cc/82NQ-SGX9].  
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government.205 On September 17, 2018, the ENCJ General Assembly 
suspended the Polish National Judicial Council (the Polish acronym 
being  KRS) from the ENCJ, saying that the KRS could no longer fulfil 
the requirement that ENCJ members be “independent of the executive 
and legislation and ensure the final responsibility for the support of the 
judiciary in the independent delivery of justice.”206 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers visited Poland on October 23-27, 2017, after which he issued 
a preliminary statement.207 His official report was made to the UN 
Human Rights Council on June 25, 2018. Subsection II.B.1 cites a 
number of his factual findings.  He termed Poland’s efforts to reform 
the judiciary as “planning a clear out of senior judges to be replaced by 
magistrates recommended by a council of mostly political appointees 
of the current ruling majority.”208 
Responding to 2016 and 2017 changes in Polish law regarding the 
judiciary, GRECO commenced a Rule 34 ad hoc procedure to consider 
whether Poland is in serious violation of GRECO’s anti-corruption 
standards governing member states.209 In March 2018, GRECO 
adopted an ad hoc Report with recommendations and sent an on-site 
evaluation team to Poland on May 15-16, 2018.210 That visit culminated 
in adoption of a June 2018 Addendum to Poland’s 2012 Fourth 
Evaluative Report on compliance with GRECO membership 
standards.211 Subsection I.B.1 of this Article cites a number of factual 
 
205.  ENCJ Position Paper, supra note 178, at point 3 (“General Assembly and the Board 
of the ENCJ time and again made statements about the then draft law concerning the KRS . . . 
.”); EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, POSITION PAPER OF THE BOARD 
OF THE ENCJ ON THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE KRS OF POLAND para. 3 (2018), available 
at https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/News/ENCJ%20Board%20position%20paper%20on%20KRS%20Poland.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DFT8-F2EA].  
206.  EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, ENCJ Suspends Polish 
National Judicial Council - KRS, https://www.encj.eu/node/495 [https://perma.cc/2ZML-
3SHD]. 
207.  Diego García-Sayán, Preliminary observations on the official visit to Poland: United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, OFF. OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Oct. 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22313&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/3XF7-YAEG]. 
208.  Poland: Reforms a Serious Blow to Judicial Independence, SCOOP (June 26, 2018), 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1806/S00138/poland-reforms-a-serious-blow-to-judicial-
independence.htm [https://perma.cc/72QZ-775D]. 
209.  GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at paras. 2-8. 
210.  Id. at para. 7.  
211.  Id. at paras. 7, 9.    
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findings from the March and June GRECO documents. The June 
GRECO resolution directs Polish authorities to respond by March 31, 
2019 to items deemed problematic under GRECO’s anti-corruption 
system, which include the following.212 The new NJC composition 
does not meet the GRECO standard that half of the members be judges 
appointed by their peers.213 With regard to the Polish Supreme court,  
the new extraordinary appeals and disciplinary chambers of the Polish 
Supreme Court should be reconsidered; the executive should reduce 
involvement in the court’s organization; and the new retirement age 
should not be applied to sitting judges.214 GRECO expressed concerns 
about new disciplinary procedures for both supreme and ordinary court 
judges that allow for the undue influence from the political branches.215 
GRECO also raised undue influence of the executive on appointments 
of the presidents and vice-presidents of the ordinary courts.216 
The European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(commonly called the Venice Commission) is the Council of Europe’s 
advisory body on constitutional matters.217 The Venice Commission 
issued opinions on Polish legislation in the five areas that were 
necessary to take political control of the judicial system: the 
Constitutional Tribunal,218  the Public Prosecutor’s office,219 the 
National Council of the Judiciary,220 the Supreme Court,221 and the 
Ordinary Courts.222 These Venice Commission Opinions are cited 
 
212.  Id. at paras. 57-58. 
213.  Id. at para. 57, subpart i.  
214.  Id. at para. 57, subpart ii. 
215.  Id. at para.  57, subpart iii. 
216.  Id. at para. 57, subparts iv, v, and vi. 
217.  See THE VENICE COMM’N OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., supra note 94. 
218.  European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission), 
Opinion 833/2015 on the Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2016)001. (March 
11-12, 2016); European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission), 
Opinion 860/2016 on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal adopted by the Venice Commission 
at its 108th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2016)026. (Oct. 14-15, 2016). 
219.  European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission), 
Opinion 892/2017 on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as Amended adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 113th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2017)028, December 8-9 2017. 
220.  European Commission for Democracy through Law (VENICE Commission), 
Opinion 904/2017 on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; 
on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland; 
and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, adopted by the Venice Commission at 
its 113th Plenary Session, CDL-AD(2017)031, (Dec. 8-9, 2017).  
221.  Id. 
222.  Id.  
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repeatedly in the GRECO and UN Special Rapporteur reports, by the 
European Parliament and European Commission, and in many of the 
analyses by nongovernmental and other international organizations.   
The Venice Commission’s December 11, 2017 Opinion 904 regarding 
changes to the National Judiciary Council, Supreme Court, and 
Ordinary Courts referred five times to similarities to Soviet systems of 
justice.223 
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 
2188 passed on October 11, 2017. The resolution identifies Poland as 
one of five countries presenting examples of a “new threat to the rule 
of law,” citing particularly the judiciary’s independence, the 
amendments to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, 
concerns regarding the law on ordinary courts, and failure to implement 
the Venice Commission’s recommendations with regard to the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
The European Parliament’s November 2017 resolution also cited 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (“OSCE/ODIHR”) 
opinions on Polish draft laws regarding the judiciary from May 5, 
2017224 and August 30, 2017,225 the UN Human Rights Committee 
report on October 31, 2016,226 and Canada’s intervention on May 9, 
2017 at the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of 
Poland.227 
 
223.  Point cited in WHERE THE LAW ENDS, supra note 81 at 13; VENICE Commission 
Opinion 904/2017, at paras. 54 (similarity to Soviet system allowing opening of past final 
judgments), 59 (allowing reopening of past judgments without notifying the parties), 61 
(deeming possibility of reversal of old, final judgments worse than the Soviet system), 67 (on 
lay members to judicial panels), and 89 (on the irony that “reforms” characterized as a “de-
communization” have so many resemblances to the Soviet system).  
224.  OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Final Opinion 
on Draft Amendments to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and Certain Other 
Acts of Poland (Opinion-Nr.: JUD-POL/305/2017-Final [AlC/YM]) (May 5, 2017). 
225.  OSCE OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Opinion on 
Certain Provisions of the Draft Act on the Supreme Court of Poland (Opinion-Nr.: JUD-
POL/313/2017 [AlC]) (Nov. 13, 2017). 
226.  Seventh Periodic Rep. of the U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/POL/7 
(Oct. 31, 2016). 
227.  EUR. PARL. DOC., supra note 192, at 4. 
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3. Three EU Firsts: Invocation of EU Rule of Law Framework, 
Article 7 Proceeding, and Proposal to Link EU Funding to Rule of 
Law 
In November 2014, the European Commission (“EC” or 
“Commission”) adopted a new “Rule of Law Framework.”228 The 
Framework was adopted to fill a gap in EU remedies to “resolve future 
threats to the rule of law” before a Member State’s situation  reached 
the level of a “‘clear risk of a serious breach’” of  rule of law, which 
TEU Article 2 lists as one of the common values upon which the EU 
was founded.229  TEU Article 7 is the TEU’s remedy for such a “‘clear 
risk of a serious breach’” of Article 2 values and provides for a possible 
sanction of suspension of a Member State’s EU rights including voting 
in the European Council.230 When the Commission adopted the 2014 
Framework document, the TEU Article 7 had never been activated.231  
 The Framework document notes that the Rule of Law procedure 
is “without prejudice” to the Commission’s powers to launch an 
infringement action under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (“TFEU”) to remedy specific situations where 
a Member States’ law or practices are in violation of EU treaties.232  
The Rule of Law Framework and TEU Article 7, though, are addressed 
to “systemic threat to rule of law” while an TFEU Article 258 
infringement action are launched for a “breach of a specific provision 
of EU law.”233 
 
228.  Rule of law framework, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/
justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/rule-law/rule-law-framework_en (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/34FC-64CU]; EUR. PARL. RES. SERV., Briefing no. PE 
573.922, Understanding the EU Rule of Law Mechanisms (2016), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573922/EPRS_BRI(2016)573922_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QX3K-DZ9J]. 
229.  Rule of law framework, supra note 228, at 3 and 6.; Version of the Treaty on European 
Union, art. 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TEU]. 
230.  TEU, art. 7. 
231.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COLLEGE ORIENTATION DEBATE ON RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND AND THE RULE OF LAW FRAMEWORK: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 
(2016), at 4. 
232.  Rule of law framework, supra note 228, at 3; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union art. 258, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter 
TFEU]; Infringement procedure, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
making-process/applying-eu-law/infringement-procedure_en [https://perma.cc/8LU4-EUAR] 
(last visited Fed. 4, 2019); European Commission, MEMO/12/12, Infringements: Frequently 
Asked Questions,  EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 17, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-12-12_en.htm [https://perma.cc/KLH4-QGAP].  
233.  Rule of law framework, supra note 228, at 3, 5-8.  
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In January 2016, the European Commission (“EC” or 
“Commission”) initiated the Rule of Law Framework for the first 
time—regarding Poland.234 Acting within the Framework, the EC made 
Rule of Law Recommendations to Poland on July 27, 2017;235 
December 21, 2016;236 and July 27, 2016.237 Finding the Polish 
government’s response inadequate, the Commission issued a fourth 
Rule of Law recommendation on December 20, 2017.238  This time the 
EC also submitted their Reasoned Proposal for a Decision of the 
European Council under Article 7(1), the first triggering of the Article 
7 proceeding in EU history.239  
An Article 7 proceeding can be triggered by a reasoned proposal 
of the European Commission, European Parliament, or one third of the 
Member States.240 As the first such procedure, the process is somewhat 
uncharted territory and does not come with specific rules and  
timetables.241   A 2016 European Parliament Briefing document 
describes the EU as having chosen a “political” rather than “legal” 
 
234.  Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, COM (2017) 835 final (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49108.  
235.  Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland Complementary 
to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146, COM (2017) 5320 final 
(July 27, 2017).  
236.  Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland Complementary 
to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, COM (2016) 8950 final (Dec. 21, 2016). 
237.  Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, COM (2016) 
5703 final (July 27, 2016).  
238.  Commission Recommendation Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland Complementary 
to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146, and (EU) 2017/1520, COM 
(2017) 9050 final (Dec. 20, 2017).  
239.  EC Reasoned Proposal, supra note 234. 
240.  TEU, supra note 229, at art. 7(1). The European Parliament apparently deferred to 
the EC’s lead in triggering Article 7 with regard to Poland, Badowski, supra note 182.  On March 
1, 2018, the EP voted 422 in favor, 147 against, and 48 abstaining on a non-binding resolution 
to support the EC’s action, see Eur. Parl. Press Release 20180226IPR98615, Rule of law in 
Poland: Parliament supports EU action (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/press-room/20180226IPR98615/rule-of-law-in-poland-parliament-supports-eu-action 
[https://perma.cc/W5WZ-QTR6]. On September 12, 2018, the EP triggered an Article 7 
proceeding against Hungary, see European Parliament Press Release 20180906IPR12104, Rule 
of law in Hungary: Parliament calls on the EU to act (Sept. 9, 2018), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12104/rule-of-law-in-
hungary-parliament-calls-on-the-eu-to-act [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-Q6JU]. 
241.  Eszter Zalan, EU action on Hungary and Poland drowns in procedure, EU 
OBSERVER, (Nov. 13, 2018, 09:21 AM), https://euobserver.com/political/143359; Eszter Zalan, 
EU ministers struggle to deal with Poland and Hungary, EU OBSERVER (Oct. 16, 2018, 5:18 
PM), https://euobserver.com/justice/143122. 
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approach with Article 7.242  The General Affairs Council of the Council 
of the European Union has held three formal hearings on the Article 7 
proceeding against Poland.243 The European Parliament Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs made a mission to Poland on 
September 19-21, 2018244 with a follow-up hearing on November 20, 
2018 in Brussels.245   
On May 2, 2018, the European Commission presented a proposed 
European Union budget for 2021-2027.246  With the budget, the 
Commission also proposed a regulation “on the protection of the 
Union’s budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule 
of law in the Member States.”247  The budget proposal lists components 
of a Member state’s legal system necessary for the EU to “protect its 
budget,” assure “sound financial management,” and the “financial 
interests of the Union.”248  One of those is “effective review by 
independent courts.”249 The overall explanation for this priority is, 
“Only an independent judiciary that upholds the rule of law and legal 
certainty in all Member States can ultimately guarantee that money 
 
242.  EUR. PARL. RES. SERV., supra note 228, at 3. 
243.  General Affairs Council, EUROPEAN COUNCIL (June 26, 2018), https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2018/06/26/ [https://perma.cc/JWW9-5JH7 ]; General 
Affairs Council, EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/meetings/gac/2018/09/18/ [https://perma.cc/26YC-WL38]; General Affairs Council, 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/
gac/2018/12/11/ https://perma.cc/QUE9-8S5B]. 
244.  EUR. PARL. COMM. ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS, Draft 
Mission Report Following the Ad Hoc Delegation to Poland on the Situation of the Rule of Law, 
September 19-21, 2018 (Nov. 19, 2018), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Nov. 19, 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/
plmrep/COMMITTEES/LIBE/DV/2018/12-03/mission_report_Poland_EN.pdf. 
245.  EUR. PARL. COMM. ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS, Draft 
Agenda: Public Hearing on “The Situation of the Rule of Law in Poland, In Particular as 
Regards the Independence of the Judiciary,” LIBE_OJ (2018) 1120 (Nov. 20, 2018), EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT (Nov. 20, 2018) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/
COMMITTEES/LIBE/DV/2018/11-19/Draftprogramme_hearing_rule_of_law_Poland_EN
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7AP-RZR6]. 
246.  European Commission Press Release IP/18/3570, EU budget: Commission proposes 
a modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends (May 2, 2018), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3570_en.htm [https://perma.cc/P226-HL6J]. 
247.  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regard the rule of law in 
the Member States, Com (2018) 324 final (May 2, 2018).  
248.  EU Budget for the Future: Sound Financial Management and the Rule of Law, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 2, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/budget-proposals-financial-management-rule-law-may2018_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TE6-TNNW]. 
249.  Id. 
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from the EU budget is sufficiently protected.”250  On January 17, 2019, 
the European Parliament approved the proposed regulation by a vote of 
394 in favor, 158 against, and 69 abstentions.251  Final approval must 
come from the Council.252  European Union money has represented 
more than sixty-one percent of Poland’s infrastructure spending,253 and 
currently Poland is the largest beneficiary of European Union funds, 
receiving “some 14 billion euro annually.”254  A January 2019 study by 
the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs considers the various EU mechanisms available 
to safeguard basic principles and values, reviews the Rule of Law 
approaches taken with regard to Poland and Hungary, and makes 
proposals for improving the protection of the rule of law in the EU.255 
4. Opening the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) 
Front 
While the TEU Article 7 process and proposal to link EU budget 
funds to rule of law proceed, the CJEU has become a center of action 
regarding the Polish judiciary.  
 a. European Commission Article 258 Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union Infringement Proceedings 
On the same day the Article 7 proceeding was launched, the 
Commission  broke new ground by bringing the CJEU the first Article 
258 TFEU infringement proceeding based on  a violation of Article 
19(1) of the TEU read with Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
 
250.  Id.  
251.  Lili Bayer, European Parliament backs plan to link EU funds to rule of law, POLITICO 
(Jan. 17, 2019, 7:33 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/budget-hungary-poland-rule-of-law-
european-parliament-backs-plan-to-link-eu-funds/ [https://perma.cc/Y8LN-FHMQ].  
252.  EU Budget for the Future, supra note 248.  
253.  Steven Erlanger, As Poland and Hungary Flout Democratic Values, Europe Eyes the 
Aid Spigot, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/world/
europe/poland-hungary-european-union-money.html.  
254.  Slawomir Sierakowski, The Beginning of the End for Poland’s Populists, N.Y.TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/opinion/the-beginning-of-the-end-for-
polands-populists.html. 
255.  Eur. Parl., Policy Dep’t for Citizens’ Rights and Const. Affairs, The EU Framework 
for Enforcing the Respect of the Rule of Law and the Union’s Fundamental Principles and 
Values 31 (2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608856/IPOL_
STU(2019)608856_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN5A-HPYZ]. 
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Fundamental Rights.256 This  infringement action concerned the Polish 
Law on Ordinary Courts Organisation,  the expressed concern being 
that giving the  President discretionary power to extend the term of 
judges who had reached retirement age endangered judicial 
independence, which is a necessary element of a right to a fair trial.257  
On July 2, 2018, the Commission launched its second TFEU 
Article 258 infringement regarding judicial independence in Poland by 
sending a Letter of Formal Notice to Poland regarding the twenty-seven  
Supreme Court judges who faced retirement the following day.258  On 
October 2, 2018, the Commission brought the infringement action to 
the CJEU requesting an interim ruling to suspend the legislation 
lowering the Supreme Court retirement age with regard to sitting 
judges, ensure that judges affected could continue to serve, restrain the 
Polish government from appointing new judges, and order Poland to 
inform the CJEU regarding compliance.259 The Commission’s 
infringement petition asserted that the new law taking effect July 3 
violated the principle of judicial independence, including the 
“irremovability” of judges, and Poland’s obligations under Article 
19(1) of the TEU read with Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which establishes member states’ obligations 
regarding fair trials.”260 The Commission’s fall 2018 infringement 
action concerned lowering the retirement age for sitting judges and the 
same kind of Presidential discretion power to extend the term that was 
 
256.  European Commission Press Release IP/17/5367, Rule of Law: European 
Commission Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in Poland (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.pdf; Dimitry Kochenov, Laurent Pech, & 
Kim Lane Scheppele, The European Commission’s Activation of Article 7: Better Late than 
Never, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-european-
commissions-activation-of-article-7-better-late-than-never/ (asserting this as the first claim of 
this kind given that this combination was raised in a December 2015 action against Hungary but 
dropped before reaching the CJEU).  
257.  Case C-192/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-192/18 (Mar. 15, 2018).   
258.  European Commission Press Release IP/18/4341, Rule of Law: Commission 
Launches Infringement Procedure to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court 
(July 2, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4341_en.htm. 
259.  Case C-619/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland 2018, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-192/18 (Mar. 15, 2018); European Commission Press 
Release IP/18/5830, Rule of Law: European Commission Refers Poland to the European Court 
of Justice to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 2018), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_I P-18-5830_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5WY7-K9TD]. 
260.  Id.  
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the basis of the first infringement action with regard to the Ordinary 
Courts.  
On October 19, 2018 the Vice President of the CJEU 
provisionally granted the European Commission’s prayers for relief in 
the infringement action pending an order on the interim proceedings.261  
On November 16, 2018, the CJEU President ordered that the matter be 
determined under the CJEU’s expedited procedures.262 Following an 
oral argument on November 16, on December 17, 2018 the CJEU 
Grand Chamber adopted the reasoning of the October 2018 Vice 
President’s decision and ordered the Polish government to suspend the 
pertinent provisions of Polish law, take “all necessary measures” to 
assure the affected judges could perform as they had prior to April 3, 
2018, refrain from appointing judges to fill the relevant positions 
including that of the office of First President, and notify the European 
Commission within one month and at regular intervals after about 
compliance.263  
In response to the Commission’s moves on infringement, a senior 
Polish government official said Poland might ignore a ruling of the 
CJEU.264  Despite the pending CJEU infringement action, on October 
10, 2018, Poland’s President swore in twenty-seven new Supreme 
Court judges.265 On October 24, 2018, PiS Party leader Jarosław 
 
261.  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 159/18, Poland must 
immediately suspend the application of the provisions of national legislation relating to the 
lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-10/cp180159en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KUU8-TEYF].   
262.  Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 204/18, Poland Must 
Immediately Suspend the Application of the Provisions of National   Relating to the Lowering 
of the Retirement Age for Supreme Court Judges (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_1534878/en/;  Case C-619/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of 
Poland, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209302&pageIndex
=0&doclang=PL&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11865245 (Dec. 17, 2018).   
263.  Case C-619/18, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland 2018, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-619/18%20R (Dec. 17, 2018); 
European Commission Press Release IP/18/5830, Rule of Law: European Commission Refers 
Poland to the European Court of Justice to Protect the Independence of the Polish Supreme Court 
(Sept. 24, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5830_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5WY7-K9TD]. 
264.  Alexandra Brzozowski, Poland threatens to ignore rulings of EU’s top court, 
EURACTIV (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/poland-
threatens-to-ignore-rulings-of-eus-top-court/ [https://perma.cc/SUC6-LP67]. 
265.  Monika Ścisłowska, Polish leader appoints top court judges, against ruling, AP 
NEWS, (Oct. 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/72f55291a715434bb2e32707f3c0ede9 
[https://perma.cc/76G7-8HP8]. 
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Kaczyński said Poland would fight the October 19 CJEU order.266 Just 
the day before, CJEU President Koen Lenaerts told journalists that 
refusal to comply with an EU order puts the country “outside the legal 
order.”267 Perhaps because of the PiS party’s poor showing in urban 
areas in the local elections in October and November 2018,268 on 
November 21, 2018, the Polish government reversed course with the 
Sejm’s passage of legislation nullifying the forced retirement for 
Supreme Court judges.269 After passage, by the Polish Senate, 
President Duda signed the bill into law on December 10, 2018.270 
Poland now asserts that the infringement action should be dropped 
because Polish law is in compliance.271 The European Commission and 
at least four Member States argue that the questions of European treaty 
law involved should still be decided.272 
 
266.  Marek Strzelecki & Stephanie Bodoni, No Polish Wiggle Room on Judges as EU 
Court Chief Spells Out Law, BLOOMBERG (Oct 24, 2016, 6:46 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-24/poland-delays-moves-in-eu-court-row-
till-after-election-run-off.  
267.  Id. 
268.  Slawomir Sierakowski, The Beginning of the End for Poland’s Populists, N.Y.TIMES, 
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/opinion/the-beginning-of-the-end-for-
polands-populists.html (scope of election defeat, reporting 80% of Poles support European 
integration, the highest in Europe); Vanessa Gera, Major Setback for Poland’s Ruling Populists 
in Mayoral Races, AP NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/
27508bc038e54ed281034d022eb00020 [https://perma.cc/YK8Y-PLRM]. 
269.  Vanessa Gera, Poland moves to reinstate retired judges to Supreme Court, AP NEWS, 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/9e4251bb43c8422ab1f0bb4d0fb7eea2 [https://
perma.cc/J2NU-3CVX].  
270.  Joanna Berendt & Marc Santora, Poland Reverses Supreme Court Purge, Retreating 
from Conflict with E.U., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/17/world/europe/poland-supreme-court.html.   
271.  Maciej Deja, Wraca sprawa polska w TSUE. Rząd przekazał raport Komisji [The 
Polish CJEU case. The government has forwarded the report to the Commission], WP 
WIADOMOŚCI (Jan. 17, 2019), https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/wraca-sprawa-polska-w-tsue-rzad-
przekazal-raport-komisji-6339487785006721a?amp=1; see infra note 272. 
272.  Łukasz Woźnicki, Cztery unijne kraje przeciw czystce w polskim Sądzie Najwyższym 
[Four EU countries against purges in the Polish Supreme Court], WYBORCZA.PL, (Jan. 4, 2019, 
7:12 PM) http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24333404,cztery-unijne-kraje-przeciw-czystce-w-
polskim-sadzie-najwyzszym.html. Just as this article was going to press, on February 12, 2019, 
the CJEU held a hearing on the Commission’s infringement action on the Supreme Court 
retirements with an announcement that the Advocate General would reach a decision regarding 
the final ruling in this case by April 11, 2018 with the decision by the CJEU 15-member Grand 
Chamber by the end of April or May, infra note 297. 
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b. Article 267 TFEU Requests for Preliminary Rulings on 
Interpretation of EU Treaties as Necessary to Decide Matters in 
National Courts 
In March 2018, Irish High Court Justice Aileen Donnelly stayed 
the extradition of Artur Celmer, a Polish national accused of drug 
trafficking, questioning whether independence of the Polish judiciary 
had so deteriorated that it threatened the mutual trust and recognition 
among EU jurisdictions upon which the European Arrest Warrant 
system rests.273 She ruled that guidance was needed from the CJEU.274 
Hence, she made a request for preliminary ruling under Article 267 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which permits a 
Member State court  to request a CJEU ruling on the interpretation of 
EU treaties and acts  where such guidance may be necessary to make a 
decision in the national court.275 Justice Donnelly’s ruling cited the 
European Commission’s Reasoned Proposal triggering the Article 7 
proceeding276 and opinions of the Venice Commission on Polish legal 
reforms,277 saying these may, “taken as a whole, breach the common 
value of the rule of law referred to in Article 2 TEU.”278 Attacks on 
Justice Donnelly for her sexual orientation by conservative Polish 
press279 drew swift condemnation from the Association of Judges of 
Ireland.280  
 
273.  Extradition to Poland Case Comes Back Before Judge, THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/extradition-to-poland-case-
comes-back-before-judge-1.3428657 [https://perma.cc/L23P-HZSE]; Extraditions to Poland 
May Be Suspended EU-Wide, Lawyers Say, THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/extraditions-to-poland-may-be-suspended-
eu-wide-lawyers-say-1.3425284 [https://perma.cc/Q2FL-747J]. 
274.  Id. 
275.  TFEU, supra note 232, art. 267; EUR. PARL. RES. SERV., Briefing no. PE 
608.628, Preliminary Reference Procedure (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/BRIE/2017/608628/EPRS_BRI(2017)608628_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WM5-44K8]. 
276.  Case C-216/18, Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM (Deficiencies in the System 
of Justice), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-216/18%20PPU (June 
28), [https://perma.cc/LZ9T-5P2C]. 
277.  Id.  
278.  Id.  
279.  Polish Right-Wingers Focus Ire on “Irish Lesbian Judge,” THE IRISH TIMES (Mar. 
14, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/polish-right-wingers-
focus-ire-on-irish-lesbian-judge-1.3427114 [https://perma.cc/8QHU-2LBQ]. 
280.  Judges Condemn “Personalised Attacks and Invective” by Polish Media, THE IRISH 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/judges-
condemn-personalised-attacks-and-invective-by-polish-media-1.3428170 [https://perma.cc/
CWZ7-PGZA]. 
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 On June 28, 2018, the Advocate General of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union delivered the CJEU opinion ruling that, to deny 
extradition, a court must find a real risk of flagrant denial of justice to 
the particular person involved on account of deficiencies in the system 
of justice of the Member State requesting extradition.281 On July 25, 
2018, the Court (Grand Chamber of the CJEU) handed down its 
decision following the Advocate General’s reasoning in her June 28 
decision.282 The Grand Chamber acknowledged the Irish court’s 
awareness of  
“material, such as that set out in the reasoned proposal of the 
European Commission adopted pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU, 
indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right 
to a fair trial guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on 
account of systematic or generalised deficiencies so far as 
concerns the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary 
. . .”283   
The Court then ruled that, to make a decision on executing the Polish 
arrest warrant, the Irish court must “determine, specifically and 
precisely,” whether the person in question will run a risk of denial of a 
fair trial if surrendered to Poland.284 
To make the individual assessment required by the CJEU ruling, 
Justice Donnelly sought assurances with regard to Mr. Celmer’s ability 
to get a fair trial based on “Poland’s deputy justice minister [having 
been] quoted as calling him a ‘dangerous criminal’ connected to a 
‘drugs mafia’, despite the presumption of innocence.”285  Judge Joanna 
Bitner, the President of the Warsaw Regional Court, who had been 
appointed to the position in the Minister of Justice’s recent round of 
replacements of court presidents, replied “‘any and all such statements’ 
by politicians and the media were ‘absolutely irrelevant’ and had no 
impact on a judge’s decision making process and that Polish judges 
 
281.  Deficiencies in the System of Justice Case, supra note 278.  
282.  Case C-216/18, Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM (Deficiencies in the System 
of Justice), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=204384&page
Index=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11867445 (July 25, 2018). 
283.  Id. at para. 79. 
284.  Id. at para. 34. 
285.  Ruaidhrí Giblin, Supreme Court to decide on extradition of wanted Polish man, THE 
IRISH TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-
w/courts/supreme-court-to-decide-on-extradition-of-wanted-polish-man-1.3726503 
[https://perma.cc/9ETV-RDA9]. 
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“were independent and subject only to the Polish constitution and 
laws.”286  The original trial judge, Piotr Gąciarek, however, wrote to the 
High Court that “it was ‘not true’ for his superior to have said the 
independence of judges and courts in Poland was not presently at risk” 
but rather that laws of the last three years and their operation by 
“‘politicians currently in power’ posed ‘very serious threats’ to the 
Polish justice system.”287 
On November 28, 2018, Justice Donnelly ruled that Mr. Celmer 
could be surrendered but also said there was “at least the possibility of 
‘another view prevailing,’” stayed her order, and suggested that the 
matter should be decided in a “ ‘leapfrog’ appeal” to the Irish Supreme 
Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal.288  The Irish Court of Appeal 
President, supported by the Irish Ministry of Justice, permitted the 
direct appeal to the Irish Supreme Court” where the matter will be 
heard.289 On January 4, 2019, a Dutch court decided to temporarily 
suspend extradition of eleven people with Polish European arrest 
warrants.290  The court’s statement said that it found the answers to 
questions the Dutch courts had proffered to Polish courts seeking 
extradition regarding independence of the Polish judiciary and 
consequences for the rights of the particular suspects to thus far be 
“incomplete or requiring further questions.”291 
Since institution of the Irish case, Polish courts have sent at least 
nine Article 267 request for preliminary ruling to the CJEU.292  In 
August 2018, a seven-member panel of Polish Supreme Court judges 
 
286.  Id.  
287.  Id.  
288.  Ruaidhrí Giblin, High Court Permits Appeal Against Decision to Extradite a Man to 
Poland, IRISH EXAMINER (Nov. 28, 2018), 5:13PM), https://www.irishexaminer.com/
breakingnews/ireland/high-court-permits-appeal-against-decision-to-extradite-man-to-poland-
888566.html [https://perma.cc/VU6K-ELCA]. 
289.  Giblin, supra note 285.   
290.  Holenderski sąd: nie będzie ekstradycji do Polski, niezależność sądów zagrożona 
[Dutch Court: There will be no extradition to Poland, the independence of the courts is at stake], 
NIEDZIELA, NL (Jan. 6, 2019), http://www.niedziela.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=19162:2019-01-06-10-03-15&catid=77:h [https://perma.cc/9EJR-R4ZB]. 
291.  Id.  
292.  Seven of those cases are discussed below.  Two additional Article 267 requests raise 
issues related to cases discussed. Case C-537/18, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-537/18 (Aug. 17, 2018); Case C-
623/18, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=
en&num=C-623/18 (Oct. 3, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EV24-2JPJ].  
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referred five questions to the CJEU.293  The referring judges raised 
whether the new Supreme court retirement law was consistent with 
Articles 2, 4, and 19 of the TEU and Articles 21 and 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as a Council 
Directive regarding equal treatment in employment.294  Two of the 
judges on adjudicating panels would be affected by the new 
provisions.295  The panel suspended the pertinent provisions, and two 
of the questions to the CJEU concerned the national court’s obligation 
to apply them if doing so would violate EU law.296 
This case was set for argument in the CJEU  on February 12, 2019 
but was removed from the CJEU calendar.297  The Polish government’s 
repeal of the retirement provisions with regard to sitting judges was 
described previously in the Subsection on the European Commission’s 
Article 258 infringement action with regard to them.298 The Polish press 
reports that, in early January  2019, the CJEU requested the Polish 
Supreme Court to respond by January 28 as to whether the Court still 
thinks it necessary for the CJEU to respond to the referral for 
preliminary ruling in this matter.299 Terminating the August 2018 
Article 267 preliminary ruling, however,  would not in itself dispose of 
 
293.  Case C-522/18, DŚ v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle, Request 
for a Preliminary Ruling, (Aug. 9, 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:62018CN0522&from=EN [https://perma.cc/4Q7Q-FXWT]. 
294.  Id.  
295.  Case C-522/18, DŚ v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Jaśle, Request 
for a Preliminary Ruling, Order of the President of the Court, paras. 6-7 (Sept. 26, 
2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=206423&pageIndex=
0&doclang=PL&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11869258.  
296.  Id. at para. 14.  
297.  TSUE odwołał rozprawę w sprawie pytań prejudycjalnych Sądu Najwyższego, [The 
CJEU cancels the hearing on the Supreme Court’s request for ruling on preliminary questions] 
POLSKIE RADIO.PL, (Jan. 15 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/1223/
Artykul/2246394,TSUE-odwolal-rozprawe-w-sprawie-pytan-prejudycjalnych-Sadu-
Najwyzszego [https://perma.cc/J2YZ-YP9U].  Argument on the European Commission’s 
Article 258 infringement matter regarding the Supreme Court was argued on February 12, 2019 
instead, see supra notes 258-272 and accompanying text. An opinion by the CJEU’s Advocate 
General in that case is expected on April 11, 2019 with the final ruling by the CJEU 15-member 
Grand Chamber by the end of April or May. Tomasz Bielecki, Po rozprawie w TSUE. Skutek 
uboczny sporu o Sąd Najwyższy? KRS też idzie pod lupę [After the CJEU Hearing. A side effect 
of the Supreme Court dispute? The NJC goes under the microscope], WYBORCZA.PL (Feb. 12, 
2019, 2:38 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,24451612,po-rozprawie-w-tsue-skutek-uboczny-
sporu-o-sad-najwyzszy-krs.html [https://perma.cc/EXJ9-EZXG] (argument in Article 258 
infringement matter also raised whether the NJC in its current form can protect judicial 
independence).  
298.  Supra notes 264-272 and accompanying text. 
299.  POLSKIE RADIO, supra note 297.  
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the Article 258 infringement case brought by the European 
Commission.300  Belgium, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Denmark filed 
comments saying the Article 267 matter should still be decided by the 
CJEU.301 
In other Article 267 matters, two judges from the ordinary courts 
raised whether the new disciplinary court structure and procedure 
raised threats to judicial independence for judges ruling in cases where 
the government is a party given the nature of the new disciplinary 
procedure that the government has created .302  While their request for 
a temporary ruling was denied on October 1, 2018 with regard to the 
standards for expedited ruling, the October decision did not address the 
substantive questions presented and are still pending in the CJEU.303 
In three additional cases, the Polish Supreme Court questioned 
whether the legitimacy of the newly-constituted National Judiciary 
Council and judges appointed by it must be decided before they could 
hear the matters before them.304 One of the cases was brought by a 
Supreme Administrative Court judge who had sought extension of 
retirement at 65, received a negative opinion from the NJC, and argued 
he should retain the right to appeal to the Labor Chamber of the 
Supreme Court as prior law had provided.305 Under new law, appeal 
would go to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court with 
newly-appointed judges closely linked to the Minster of Justice.306 The 
 
300.  Piotr Bogdanowicz and Maciej Taborowski, Why the EU Commission and the Polish 
Supreme Court Should not Withdraw their Cases from Luxembourg, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Dec. 
3, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/why-the-eu-commission-and-the-polish-supreme-court-
should-not-withdraw-their-cases-from-luxembourg/ [https://perma.cc/C86Y-3QTK]. 
301.  Łukasz Woźnicki, Cztery unijne kraje przeciw czystce w polskim Sądzie Najwyższym, 
[Four EU countries against purges in the Polish Supreme Court], WYBORCZA.PL (Jan. 4, 2019, 
7:12 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24333404,cztery-unijne-kraje-przeciw-czystce-w-
polskim-sadzie-najwyzszym.html [https://perma.cc/BDC3-NSR7].   
302.  C-558/18 Sąd odsyłający: Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-558/18  (Sept. 3, 2018); C-563/18 
Prokuratura Okręgowa w Płocku from Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie w VIII Wydziale Karnym 
składzie, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-563/18 (Sept. 5, 2018).  
303.  C-558/18 Sąd odsyłający: Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi.   
304.  Case C-585/18, Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-585/18 (Nov. 26, 2018); Case C-624/18, CP, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-624/18 (Jan. 18, 2019);  Case C-
625/18, DO, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-625/18 (Jan. 18, 2019). 
In Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, Procedure in Accelerated Mode, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?docid=208542&text=&dir=&doclan
g=PL&part=1&occ=first&mode=req&pageIndex=0&cid=61%E2%80%A6 (Nov. 26, 2018). 
305.  See Joined Cases, para. 6. 
306.  Id., para. 13.  
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other two appeals were from Supreme Court judges facing retirement 
at 65.307  They argued that the new NJC is no longer performing its 
constitutional function to safeguard judicial independence and that a 
court with judges recommended by the new NJC is not an independent 
court as required by European law.308  Hence, these two judges contend, 
that they should retain their right to appeal their employment status to 
the Polish Supreme Court.  In a November 26, 2018 Order, the CJEU 
President ruled that the three joined cases would be heard under the 
CJEU’s accelerated procedure.309 These cases are reported to be 
scheduled for hearing on March 19, 2019.310 
In November 2018, the Polish Supreme Administrative Court also 
sent an Article 267 request to the CJEU regarding the claims of Polish 
Supreme Court applicants who were turned down with no reasons 
given.311 Current law gives provides no specifics on the process and 
criteria for judicial selection and no right to appeal to rejected 
candidates. 
 
307.  Id., para. 7.  
308.  Id., paras. 10-11.  
309.  Id., un-numbered Ruling paragraph. 
310.  Łukasz Woźnicki, TSUE rozbroi izbę dyscyplinarną i KRS? Rozprawa w marcu 
[CJEU will disarm the disciplinary chamber and the National Judiciary Council? Argument in 
March], WYBORCZA.PL (Dec. 13, 2018, 2:09 PM) http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24274415,tsue-
rozbroi-izbe-dyscyplinarna-i-krs-rozprawa-w-marcu.html [https://perma.cc/BF6B-ADF2]. 
311.  Case C-824/18, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (Dec. 28, 2018),  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-824/18; Komunikat w sprawie 
postanowienia NSA dotyczącego przedstawienia pytań prejudycjalnych do Trybunału 
Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej (sygn. akt II GOK 2/18) [Announcement regarding the 
Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to submit questions for a preliminary ruling to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (file reference II GOK 2/18)], (Nov. 21, 2018), 
http://www.nsa.gov.pl/komunikaty/komunikat-w-sprawie-postanowienia-nsa-dotyczacego-
przedstawienia-pytan-prejudycjalnych-do-trybunalu-sprawiedliwosci-unii-europejskiej-sygn-
akt-ii-gok-2-18,news,4,601.php; 1SA/Bk 37/09-Wyrok WSA w Białymstoku z 2009-02-25 
37/09 http://orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/doc/E3FAD68B4C;  NSA skierował do TSUE pytania 
prejudycjalne ws. wyłaniania sędziów SN [The Supreme Administrative Court referred questions 
to the CJEU regarding appointment of judges of the Supreme Court], GAZETA PRAWNA.PL 
(Nov. 22, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1360451,nsa-skierowal-do-
tsue-pytania-prejudycjalne-ws-wylaniania-sedziow-sn.html; NSA wchodzi do gry. Pyta 
Trybunał Sprawiedliwości UE o KRS [AKTUALIZOWANY] [The Supreme Administrative Court 
comes into play asking the CJEU about the National Judiciary Council] OKO.PRESS (Nov. 22, 
2018), https://oko.press/nsa-wchodzi-do-gry-pyta-trybunal-sprawiedliwosci-ue-o-krs-
aktualizowany/.  
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5.  Polexit? 
In November 2018, Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister from 
2007-2014 and now the President of the EU European Council, warned 
that the quarreling between the European Union and Poland about the 
judicial system could lead to “Poland stumbling out of the EU by 
accident.”312  The specter of de facto Polexit through actions with 
regard to the court system has been raised in at least four contexts: the 
previously-discussed enforcement of European arrest warrants;  
Poland’s flirtation with refusing to  comply with EU concerns on PiS’s 
changes to the judicial system, most specifically the orders in the 
infringement case on Supreme Court retirement; an action that Minister 
of Justice Ziobro filed in the Constitutional Tribunal to declare that an 
Article 267 CJEU preliminary ruling is not superior to a Polish court’s 
finding on what is permitted by the Polish constitution regarding the 
country’s judicial system; and another pending Constitutional Tribunal 
matter filed by the National Judiciary Council to seek to ratify their 
legitimacy. 
The Irish and Dutch courts’ extradition concerns show the risk 
that the Polish judiciary gradually will be excluded from the European 
justice system. The CJEU’s Grand Chamber decision on December 17, 
2018 regarding the European Commission infringement action refers 
to the Irish Court’s Article 267 request for preliminary ruling as 
supporting its decision that “the risk of losing confidence in the Polish 
judiciary is not fictitious or hypothetical, but quite real.”313 The arrest 
warrant cases could impact the position of the Polish judicial system in 
the courts of other EU member states, reaching far beyond extradition 
cases. Some journalists, commenting on the CJEU ruling, suggested it 
could be a first step in an informal Polexit—a departure of Poland from 
the Western legal sphere.314 Issues regarding the fairness and 
 
312.  James Shotter, Poland risks falling out of the EU by accident, warns Donald Tusk, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e62f4ce4-e142-11e8-a6e5-
792428919cee [https://perma.cc/5SPE-YVV5].  
313.  Case C-619/18R, Eur. Comm’n v Republic of Poland, para. 77, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-619/18%20R (Dec. 17, 2018). 
314.  Bartosz T. Wieliński, Odpowiedź Trybunału Sprawiedliwości ue udzielona 
Irlandzkiej sędzi depotracyjnej oznacza, że Polska jest już kroczek poza Unią [The response of 
the Court of Justice of the EU to the Irish judge means that Poland is already a step outside the 
Union], WYBORCZA.PL (July 25, 2018), http://wyborcza.pl/7,7596823715417,odpowiedz-
trybunalu-sprawiedliwosci-udzielona-irlandzkiej.html [https://perma.cc/XV2W-RPZ4]; M. 
Matczak: Polska w B-klasie praworządności – komentarz do wyroku TSUE w sprawie 
CELMER [ Poland in the B Rule of the rule of law—a commentary to the CJUE Ruling in the 
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independence of Polish courts, however, may now be raised in every 
case involving recognition of a Polish judgment.315 The CJEU’s 
decision also provides arguments for the European Commission to use 
in their pending Article 7 proceedings and consideration of linking 
budget allocation to a Member State’s rule of law institutions.  
As previously described, the Poland government initially 
suggested it might not comply with an order in the Article 258 action 
regarding the Polish Supreme Court retirement law.316 This brought a 
stern rebuke from the CJEU President that this would put Poland 
outside the EU 317 
In response to previously-described August 2018 Polish Supreme 
Court requests to the CJEU Article 267 preliminary ruling on questions 
related to the Polish Supreme Court Act, Minster of Justice (and  
Prosecutor General) Ziobro filed an action with the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal on August 23, 2018 with an extension of the 
original request on October 4, 2018.318  His petition asked the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal to rule that it would be a violation of the Polish 
Constitution to allow referral from a Polish court to the  CJEU for 
preliminary ruling on matters “pertaining to the design, shape, and 
organisation of the judiciary as well as proceedings before the judicial 
organs of a member state.”319  A flurry of commentary referred to this 
as another manifestation of Polexit from the EU legal system.320 
 
CELMER case], MONITOR KONSTYTUCYJNY (July 25, 2018), monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/
archiwa/5154 [https://perma.cc/7TUA-NDNQ]. 
315.  Łukasz Rogojsz, Prof. Kruszyński o decyzji tsue:”To bardzo groźne dla Polskiego 
wymiaru sprawiedliwości” [Prof. Kruszyński on the decision of the CJEU: “It is very dangerous 
for the Polish judiciary”], GAZETA.PL (July 25, 2018, 2:54 PM). http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/
wiadomosci/7,114884,23715446,decyzja-tsue-oznacza-wystawienie-polski-poza-nawias-
kultury.html [https://perma.cc/6P8G-59GZ]. 
316.  See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text. 
317.  See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
318.  Majewski Kacper, Will Poland, With Its Own Constitution Ablaze, Now Set Fire to 
EU Law?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/will-poland-with-
its-own-constitution-ablaze-now-set-fire-to-eu-law/, DOI: https://doi.org/10.17176/20181026-
150347-0 (citing p. 1 of the petition). 
319.  Id.  
320.  See, e.g., id.; Stanisław Biernat &  Monika Kawczyńska, Though this be Madness, 
yet there’s Method in’t: Pitting the Polish Constitutional Tribunal against the Luxembourg 
Court, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Oct. 26, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/though-this-be-
madness-yet-theres-method-int-the-application-of-the-prosecutor-general-to-the-polish-
constitutional-tribunal-to-declare-the-preliminary-ruling-procedure-unconstitut/; Tomasz 
Pietryga, Ziobro odnawia lęki o polexit - komentuje Tomasz Pietryga  [Ziobro renews fears 
about polexit - comments Tomasz Pietryga], RZECZPOSPOLITA  (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:08 AM), 
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In October 2018, Stanisław Biernat, professor of European Law 
and former Vice-President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, listed 
eight matters brought to the CT by PiS Members of Parliament or 
Prosecutor General Ziobro as cases “artificially created”  for 
constititutional review to meet an immedate political need of the 
government.321  The National Judiciary Counsel’s November 27, 2018, 
request for a ruling on their own constitutionality seems a case of this 
type.322  The Constitutional Tribunal’s current president set a panel for 
the case and hearing date of January 3, 2019 within three days of the 
matter’s filing.323  Without explanation for the reason, however, the 
hearing was cancelled and has not been rescheduled.324 One speculated  
reason is the Polish government’s fear of Polexit accusations in 
attempting to preempt a CJEU on the conformity of the newly-
constituted NJC to EU treaty law.325 
 
D. Judicial System Reforms for Consideration within International 
Rule of Law Norms 
In a 2012 book chapter, Co-Author Zoll discussed the role that the 
then recently-created Szkoła Sądownictwa i Prokuratury (School for 
Judiciary and Prosecutors or “SSIP”) was established to play in 
enhancing the quality and legitimacy of the Polish judicial system.326 
His chapter considers where democratic legitimacy for judges in civil 
law countries should lie, acknowledging that, as in Poland, today’s 
judges often have considerable scope in interpreting the law, which 
goes beyond the Napoleonic vision of legal codes that provide all 
 
https://www.rp.pl/Opinie/310179944-Ziobro-odnawia-leki-o-polexit---komentuje-Tomasz-
Pietryga.html [https://perma.cc/73M6-7SV5]. 
321.  Biernat & Kawczyńska, supra note 320; see also Sadurski, supra note 9, at 18 
(characterizing the CT’s evolution from “paralysis” to “active collaborator.”).  
322.  Łukasz Woźnicki, Nowa KRS ponad prawem. Odwołań od decyzji Rady nie będzie 
[Appeal against the decision of the NJC will not be heard], WYBORCZA.PL (Dec. 16, 2018, 3:36 
PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24283186,nowa-krs-ponad-prawem-odwolan-od-decyzji-
rady-nie-bedzie.html#nowaZajawkaGlownaMT. 
323.  Id.  
324.  Ewa Siedlecka, Legalizacja KRS w Trybunale Konstytucyjnym odwołana. Ze strachu 
przed polexitem?  [Legalization of the National Judiciary Council in the Constitutional Tribunal 
dismissed. For fear of polexit?], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://oko.press/legalizacja-krs-w-
trybunale-konstytucyjnym-odwolana-ze-strachu-przed-polexitem/. 
325.  Id. 
326. Zoll, supra note 12, at 308-09. Co-author Zoll was head of the curriculum committee 
for the new school. 
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answers such that judges perform only a mechanical function.327 The 
SSIP sought to shift some of judicial local control to choose one’s 
colleagues and replacements to a more national system using merit-
based assessments on a range of tasks over time and by multiple 
assessors. The SSIP curriculum also sought to correct some 
deficiencies in the entrants’ prior legal education. Such initiatives 
included teaching a uniform method of legal reasoning, education in 
practice-based legal ethics, and a combined first year for future judges 
and prosecutors stressing a common ethos regarding values of the legal 
system and the roles that legal professionals play within it. 
Adding the SSIP to the judicial framework sought to shift some 
power in judicial appointment from a system in which local judicial 
assemblies had central power in judicial selection, performance review, 
and promotion.328 As with the design of the National Judiciary Council, 
the Solidarity-led transition established strong judicial self-government 
to protect the judiciary from the political branches of government by 
vesting considerable power in local judicial assemblies.329 
In the original SSIP design, those going on to judicial 
apprenticeships entered a fifty-four-month program in which they 
alternated between study in the judiciary school in Krakow and 
supervised internships in courts around the country. Both in the first 
year and after, most of the curriculum in the school was active rather 
than the passive lecture form common in much of Polish university 
legal education. The SSIP curriculum featured interactive teaching, 
hypotheticals, case analysis, research, writing, and simulation.330 The 
fifty-four-month period included multiple assessments by the various 
SSIP faculty as well as judges in the field for a cumulative final 
judgment of competency to graduate the best candidates. 
 
327. Id. at 304-05; KOSAŘ, supra note 4, at 21, 36, 59-61 (expanding scope of judges’ 
interpretive powers generally and in Europe specifically). 
328. See Zoll, supra note 12, at 303-09. In the first SSIP admission year, 589 of 1320 
candidates advanced to a second stage on the results of a multiple-choice test in designated areas 
of law. The top 300 candidates from the second stage exam requiring case analysis were chosen 
for the initial SSIP class. As designed, only about half of that group of 300 were allowed to 
progress to a judicial or prosecution apprenticeship. See also Kraśnicka, supra note 2, at 704.  
329.  LITYŃSKI, supra note 38, at 45 (terming the creation of the National Judiciary 
Council as one of the most important aspects of the Roundtable agreement concerning 
independence of the judiciary); STRZEMBOSZ & ZAKROCZYMSKI, supra note 39, at 194-95 
(rationale for and history of vesting power in local judicial assemblies in December 1989 
legislation).  
330. Id. at 308. 
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In addition to a better selection system for those who entered the 
judiciary, the SSIP sought to make up for shortcomings in Polish legal 
education. Students spend much of their five years achieving the 
magister degree in law in large lectures on legal codes and theory of 
the law, which students often are not required to attend but only to pass 
the exam.331 For many professors and law schools, examination still 
heavily focuses on memorization of code sections. Many professors do 
not encourage, or even permit, questions or discussion in lectures. 
Students also have ćwiczenia (exercises) supplementing the lectures, 
which theoretically are supposed to be practical application of the 
material but often are just more explanation of the lecture.332 
As strange as it seems to an American or German, Polish law 
schools do not teach a common system of legal reasoning analogous to 
the American Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion (“IRAC”) or the 
German Gutachtenstil system.333 The unpredictability of Polish case 
law in similar fact patterns, and resulting difficulty in predicting 
outcomes in litigated matters, may stem in large part from this lack of 
unified educational standards.334 People before Polish courts likely 
often were upset by unpredictable outcomes, processes that spread over 
long periods of time, and judges and courts that were not user-friendly. 
It is understandable how corruption could have seemed a reasonable 
explanation given Poland’s communist history where corruption was a 
fact of daily life.335 
 
331. Kraśnicka, supra note 2, at 704. 
332. Id. at 698.  
333.  Lutz-Christian Wolff, Structured Problem Solving: German Methodology from a 
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19, 29 (2003);  Bucerius Law School, Der 
Gutachtenstil (Juristische Methodik) [Legal Methodology], YOUTUBE (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wxGvEYDjQqc [https://perma.cc/UQ76-LAPK] (video 
explanation prepared by Bucerius University). 
334.  TYMOTEUSZ ZYCH, W POSZUKIWANIU PEWNOŚCI PRAWA. PRECEDENS A 
PRZEWIDYWALNOŚĆ ORZECZEŃ SĄDOWYCH W TRADYCJI PRAWA ANGLOSASKIEGO [THE 
SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY IN LAW. THE PRECEDENT AND PREDICTABILITY OF JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS IN THE ANGLO-SAXON LAW TRADITION] (2017) (on the lack of unity of 
the case law of the Polish administrative courts); Wiesława Kuberska & Paweł Sydor, Prawo, 
jako targowisko opinii. Jednolitość orzecznictwa czy jego zróżnicowanie [Law as a marketplace 
of meanings. Consistency of the case law or its differentiation], 19 IUSTITIA (2015) (on the 
discrepancies of case law in Polish courts). 
335.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text (regarding the GRECO 2012 Fourth 
Evaluation finding no evidence of widespread or significant corruption among Polish judges, 
recognizing a gap in that likely reality and public perception, and making recommendations to 
improve public trust). 
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Professor Marcin Matczak makes a related argument that the post-
2015 capture of the Polish judicial system may be explained, not only 
by the strength of the PiS government’s attack but also, by “the 
weakness of the defence” provided by a legal system emphasizing 
formalism and strict textual interpretation rather than holistic, systemic 
evaluation of cases in light of constitutional principles and 
consideration of “real life consequences.”336  Fellow participants in the 
December 2017 Fordham symposium at which this paper was first 
presented, also cite as problematic a “formalist, textualist” approach 
historically predominating in Central and European judiciaries, which 
is different from the “more dynamic and purpose-oriented reasoning 
style required by European law.337  The previously-described emphasis 
in legal education on memorization rather than argumentation and 
critical assessment and lack of teaching a common form of reasoning 
beyond simple text application contribute to overformalism. 
 In the Authors’ view, value-driven jurisprudence also must 
be evaluated against the fundamental principle of justice that equal 
situations must be decided in the equal ways. The Authors contend 
that the problem with Polish case law is not the complete 
unwillingness to consider values but rather the unpredictability in 
when and how Polish courts invoke them. Sometimes a statute’s 
wording is clear, and Polish courts inject values in way that 
trespasses the bounds of the legitimate interpretation.  As Professor 
Matczak points out, in other instances, legal argument concerns only 
a superficial reading of statutes or even constitutional provisions 
without considering if the consequences of that interpretation are 
consistent with the overall purposes of the statute, underlying 
constitutional principles, or other overarching values. This lack of 
coherence begins in legal education, which does not teach future 
judges, lawyers, and prosecutors a common form of legal reasoning.  
 
336.  Marcin Matczak, The Strength of the Attack or the Weakness of the Defence? 
Poland's Rule of Law Crisis and Legal Formalism, SSRN, 12-13 (2018), available 
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121611; MARCIN MATCZAK, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, 
JUSTICE & SOCIETY, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: FACTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 6-7 
(2018), available at https://www.fljs.org/content/poland%E2%80%99s-constitutional-crisis-
facts-and-interpretations [https://perma.cc/NJA3-N2TU]. 
337.  James E. Moliterno, Lucia Berdisová, Peter Čuroš & Ján Mazúr, Independence 
Without Accountability: The Harmful Consequences of EU Policy Toward Central and 
Eastern European Entrants, 42 FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 265, 290 (2018). 
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The American and German common reasoning approaches 
contribute to a shared form of exposition in judicial opinions and 
legal argument generally.  This predictable form of reasoning 
renders judicial opinions more accessible to critical assessment, 
predictable, and understandable to people affected by such 
judgments.  
By having prosecutors and judges together in the first year, the 
SSIP also sought to instill a common ethos in at least these two groups 
of legal professionals. Over thirty-seven visits to Poland in twenty-one 
years, Co-Author Wortham has observed that judges and lawyers do 
not think of themselves in the same profession in the way that 
American lawyers do. American judges, of course, play quite a 
different role than the lawyers in their courtrooms, but almost all US 
judges were lawyers first and some return to law practice after time on 
the bench. 
American legal education is also quite uniform—especially the 
first year. American law schools not only instill a common approach to 
legal reasoning but also a common ethos about the legal system—a 
system in which legal professionals play varying roles but have a 
common understanding of the system. After the three-year JD and state 
bar exam passage, American lawyers take jobs in varying fields, but 
they do not enter multi-year apprenticeships segregated by legal 
profession. Polish law students not only split off to judicial or 
prosecutorial apprenticeships after the five-year university law degree 
but also splinter further into three other professions: public notaries, 
advocates, and legal advisors.338 Upon completion of the 
apprenticeship and passage of the bar exam, Poles are not generally 
licensed as “lawyers” but rather as members of the profession in which 
they apprenticed. Also much legal work done by law graduates in 
government, nongovernmental organizations, or in-house for 
corporations does not require a license from any of the professions, so 
those “lawyers” are not part of any of the five previously-mentioned 
professions. Only partly in jest, Wortham has observed, “Polish legal 
professions spend so much time quarreling with each other, they cannot 
present a united force in opposition to the government.” This contrasts 
with the United States, in which bar associations, including the 
American Bar Association, often speak out, on behalf of the single 
American legal profession regarding perceived threats to judges, 
 
338.  See supra note 2. 
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prosecutors, or lawyers being able to perform their roles with adequate 
independence and freedom from threat or political control. 
Both authors, in less stressful political times, favor more input 
from other Polish legal professions and the public in the way the 
judicial system functions. Co-Author Zoll’s 2012 work suggested that 
greater representation for the Polish President on the National Judiciary 
Council should be considered,339 but that did not mean the twenty-one 
out of twenty-five now effectively selected by the political party in 
power. 
Polish judicial immunity is considerably broader than the 
conventional US formulation limiting it to acts done in the judicial 
capacity.340 Polish immunity extends to a general protection from 
arrest, detention, and prosecution without a release from the relevant 
judicial disciplinary authority. This provision also applies after a judge 
has left active service. This, at first, seems jarring to an American who 
assumes a judge will be treated like anyone else if the offense involved 
is unrelated to judicial acts. Given the history in other countries in the 
region, though, of government using criminal prosecution to target 
judges—and the specter of what may happen in Poland once the PiS 
“reforms” of the courts are complete—one can see the plus side of such 
a broad form of immunity. 
The structural shortcomings in the Polish judicial system—
beginning with inadequacies in the law schools—contributed to 
conditions that likely frustrated people with matters before the courts: 
unpredictable decisions, inefficiency or delay, some judges seemingly 
arrogant or dismissive. It is beyond the scope of the Article to review 
the reams of information assessing Polish court performance and 
 
339. Zoll, supra note 12, at 306. 
340. Article 80 ¶1 of the Law on the Ordinary Courts provides that judges cannot be 
arrested or prosecuted without the permission of the disciplinary court with jurisdiction, and this 
provision applies after a judge has reached retirement age and no longer is employed at the 
courts. See Artykuł  80 ¶1 ustawy prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych from 27.7.2001, Dz. U. 
2001, nr 98, poz. 1070  [Law on the Ordinary Courts, 80 ¶1 (July 27, 2001)]; Tekst jednolity z 
dnia 14 grudnia 2018, Dz. U. 2019  poz. 52 [Consolidated text, Official Journal 2019, position 
52 (Dec. 14, 2018)].  For a parallel provision for Supreme Court judges, see Artykuł 55 ¶1 
ustawy o Sądzie Najwyższym z dnia 8.12.2018, Dz. U. 2017 poz. 5 [Law on the Supreme Court, 
Art. 48, ¶7 (December 8, 2017)]; GRECO June 2018, supra note 74, at para. 161 (describing the 
Polish system and also noting they were informed of sixty-five cases where immunity was lifted 
to allow prosecution between 2003-2011). 
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countering PiS’s charges about the judiciary.341 PiS’s previously-
quoted statements about their philosophy of law and justice and the 
facts of their concerted campaign against the judiciary evidence that 
their “good changes” are not about making the judicial system function 
better or be more accountable to the public. Instead, they are aimed to 
bring the courts within the government’s political control so they will 
not be an obstacle to the policy ends the PiS government seeks to 
achieve.342 
III. THE SOLIDARITY ROUNDTABLE NEGOTIATORS’ 
FORESIGHT ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Ironically, PiS’s threat to the judiciary has brought some changes 
that the Authors have advocated in the past. These include greater 
cooperation with other legal professions, a more accessible and open 
public face by judges, and citizen education on the role of the judiciary 
and the importance of judicial independence.343 Such initiatives support 
development of a vision of the judiciary’s role in a democratic system 
under rule of law that is shared not only among the judges but also with 
members of the other legal professions and the public.  
Some of this public outreach, however, has led to disciplinary 
investigations of participating judges. Amnesty International’s 
December 6, 2018 report, Poland: Update on the “Reform” of the 
Judiciary,” devotes about half of the text to matters pursued against 
judges through the new disciplinary apparatus.344  The Iustitia 
association of Judges and the Polish Ombudsman’s office cooperated 
on a “Pol and Rock” festival aiming to bring the  public closer to law 
 
341.  See, e.g.,  supra note 157; EWA SIEDLECKA, SȨDZIOWIE MÓWIĄ: ZAMACH PIS NA 
WYMIAR SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI [THE JUDGES ARE SPEAKING:  THE PIS COUP AGAINST THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM] 72-109 (2018).  
342.  See generally infra Subsection II.B.2 and II.C.1. 
343.  For an example of support from other Polish legal professions, see, e.g., 
#WeDisagree. The voice of Polish Lawyers, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dD-MCeD6Oec&amp=&sns=em [https://perma.cc/98BR-
UPWK]. 
344.  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 195, at 6-9; see also AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 187, at 31-35; KOMITET OBRONY SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI 
(KOS), A COUNTRY THAT PUNISHES. PRESSURE AND REPRESSION OF POLISH 
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS (2019), available at http://komitetobronysprawiedliwosci.pl/
app/uploads/2019/02/pol_wersja_fin.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU2F-7EM4] (report released Feb. 
15 2019 by the Committee for the Defense of Justice made up of twelve organizations including 
the HFHR, Amnesty International, Iustitia, Themis, and Lex super omnia). 
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with a better understanding of court work.345  The trial simulations in 
which judges participated were characterized by the disciplinary 
authorities as parodies with questions raised about whether  wearing a 
judge’s robe and the state emblem of the judge at these events was an 
“offence against the dignity of the office of judge,” and participants 
were brought in for questioning.346 In January 2019, the disciplinary 
spokesperson for the common courts announced that disciplinary 
procedures would not be brought against Judges Monika Frąckowiak 
and Arkadiusz Krupa for their participation in the trial simulations.347  
Instead of saying such activities were not disciplinary violations, he 
said the judges were not aware their actions were violations.348  A week 
later, though, the disciplinary spokesperson said that Judge Frąckowiak 
would be prosecuted for her taking excessive time in a number of 
proceedings.349 Amnesty International has criticized the disciplinary 
process’s apparent pattern of calling judges as witnesses, in that status 
denying them right to counsel, and using that process to gather 
information, e.g., three years of back judgments,  to later be used in 
prosecution on other grounds.350 
 
345.  Magdalena Gałczyńska, Sądny rok dla sądów, czyli "ekscesy" rzeczników dyscypliny. 
Jak i za co rządzący zamierzają karać sędziów? [Judicial year for courts, or “excesses” of 
disciplinary spokespersons. How and for what do the authorities intend to punish judges?], 
ONET.PL (Jan. 2, 2019, 3:07 PM) https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/sadownictwo-jak-
rzad-zamierza-karac-sedziow/vkq07dd [https://perma.cc/W6CN-K95Z]. Regarding the work of 
the Ombudsman’s office, see supra note 124. For more information about public education 
efforts by judges and lawyers’ associations at “Pol and Rock,” see Agata Szczęśniak, Co 
sędziowie i adwokaci robili na Pol’and’Rock Festival Jurka Owsiaka. Ujawniamy! [What judges 
and lawyers did on Jurek Owsiak's Pol'and'Rock Festival. We disclose!], OKO.PRESS (Aug. 5, 
2018) https://oko.press/co-sedziowie-i-adwokaci-robili-na-polandrock-festival-jurka-owsiaka-
ujawniamy/ [https://perma.cc/7BMF-8TNB].  
346.  Magdalena Gałczyńska, supra note 345; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra 
note 186, at 7. 
347.  Łukasz Woźnicki & Ewa Ivanova, Rzecznik Ziobry nie będzie ścigać sędziów za 
Pol'and'Rock [Ziobro’s spokesperson will not be prosecuting judges for Pol’ and Rock], 
WYBORCZA.PL, (Jan. 11, 2019, 2:51 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24352975,rzecznik-
ziobry-nie-bedzie-scigac-sedziow-za-pol-and-rock.html [https://perma.cc/2LW2-557M].   
348.  Id.  
349.  Mariusz Jałoszewski, Rzecznik dyscyplinarny stawia zarzuty sędziom, bo krytykowały 
władzę.”Nie przestraszę się, nie zamilknę” [The disciplinary spokesperson accuses judges 
because they criticized the authorities. “I am not afraid. I will not be silent.”], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 
18, 2019), https://oko.press/rzecznik-dyscyplinarny-stawia-zarzuty-sedziom-bo-krytykowaly-
wladze-nie-przestrasze-sie-nie-zamilkne/ [https://perma.cc/ZY69-TXY3] (including the judge’s 
response to the charges).  
350.  Amnesty International Public Statement, EUR 37/9564/2018, Poland: Judges Who 
Turned to EU Court of Justice Must Not Be Harassed (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3795642018ENGLISH.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L3ZV-RJKY]; see also two Amnesty International Reports focusing on abuses 
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Another controversy relates to judges’ display of the Konstytucja 
graphic that now appears widely on T-shirts, banners, and stickers 
throughout Poland.351 Konstytucja is the Polish word for constitution.  
In this graphic, the letters TY and JA are highlighted in contrasting 
colors to stand out. Ty in Polish means you, and ja means I, hence  
conveying a message of shared investment in the constitution.352  At a 
December 2018 meeting, the NJC with its recent new appointees 
adopted an interpretation of the Polish Code of Ethics for Professional 
Judges and Assessors saying that “public use of infographics that are 
clearly identified with political parties, trade unions, as well as social 
movements” would violate Article 10 of the Code stating that judges 
should avoid behavior that undermines confidence in their 
independence and impartiality.353 
The Amnesty International December 2018 report also says that 
the activities of the new Disciplinary Prosecutor for the common courts 
“raise concerns over targeting predominantly those  judges who have 
voiced criticism of the government’s reform of the judiciary.”354 At 
least two judges summoned for questioning were those who had made 
Article 267 requests to the CJEU, raising whether the new disciplinary 
procedure threatened their independence when ruling in the cases 
before them in which the government was a party.355 Another Amnesty 
 
of the judicial disciplinary process, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 187, at 31-35, and 
Update on Reform of the Judiciary, supra note 193, at 7-9; Magdalena Gałczyńska, Sądny rok 
dla sądów, czyli “ekscesy” rzeczników dyscypliny. Jak i za co rządzący zamierzają karać 
sędziów? [Judicial year for courts, or "excesses" of disciplinary spokespersons. How and for what do the authorities 
intend to punish the judges?], ONET.PL (Jan. 2, 2019, 3:07 PM) https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-
onecie/sadownictwo-jak-rzad-zamierza-karac-sedziow/vkq07dd [https://perma.cc/CM4G-
VTDD]. 
351.  Łukasz Woźnicki, Koszulki z "Konstytucją" nie dla sędziów. Nowa KRS zakazuje 
symbolu, bo jest "nacechowany politycznie" [Shirts with “Constitution” are not for judges. The 
new NJC prohibits the symbol because it is “politically marked”], WYBORCZA.PL, (Dec. 13, 
2018, 8:59 PM) (photograph of Łodz judges wearing the t-shifts for the 100th anniversary of 
Polish independence on November 11, 2018), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24276226,koszulki-
z-konstytucja-nie-dla-sedziow-nowa-krs-zakazuje.html [https://perma.cc/W6JY-PKR6]. 
352.  Similarly, the Iustitia judges association has used an image of judges with their 
mouths blacked out with the caption,” Dzisiaj my, jutro ty,” which translates to “Today us, 
tomorrow you.” See IUSTITIA Polish Judges Association (@JudgesSsp), TWITTER (May 18, 
2018, 9:04 AM), https://twitter.com/judgesssp/status/1042036669615140866?lang=ga. 
        353.  See supra note 351.  
        354.  Id.  
355.  Id. For other threats to judges, see Christian Davies, ‘They’re trying to break me’: 
Polish judges face state-led intimidation, THE GUARDIAN (2018), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2018/jun/19/theyre-trying-to-break-me-polish-judges-face-state-led-intimidation 
[https://perma.cc/Q3CP-ECX9]; Marc Santora, supra note 99 (reports of harassment of 
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International 2018 report focuses on actions taken toward judges 
perceived to have treated people protesting government action too 
leniently and the potential chilling effect on any judge sitting in matters  
arising from a protest action.356 
As described in Part II.D, the Authors have advocated less power 
in local judicial assemblies as well as initiatives like the previously-
described School for Judiciary and Prosecutors system, which was less 
centrally reliant on existing judges regarding the education, selection, 
and advancement of new entrants into the judicial track.357 It may be, 
however, that this local self-government fostered the “solidarity” that 
provided mutual support in opposing illegal and unconstitutional 
government initiatives despite the possible dire consequences to those 
participating.  
The overwhelming majority of Polish judges have resisted the 
ongoing reshaping of the judiciary. So many judges boycotted running 
for offices on the new, politically-controlled National Judiciary 
Council that only eighteen people applied for fifteen slots.358 Most of 
the eighteen applicants were judges seconded to the Ministry of 
Justice.359 Many judges have withdrawn their applications for 
promotion by the new Council, deeming it to be illegally constituted. 
Iustitia has called for everyone eligible for appointment to the Supreme 
Court to refrain from applying because candidacy amounts to 
participation in a coup against the independent judiciary.360 Most 
judges also refused to apply for the forty-four openings announced  for 
the Supreme Court.361  Some who did have been termed kamikaze 
judges, meaning they applied, without expectation of being appointed 
 
Waldemar Zurek, spokesperson for the NJC before the government’s replacement of its 
members); KOS, supra note 344.  
356.  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 187, at 31-35. 
357.  See supra notes 326-330 and accompanying text. 
358.  See supra note 125. 
359.  IUSTITIA and THEMIS Association statements, infra note 363; supra note 126. 
360.  IUSTITIA and THEMIS Association statements, infra note 363. 
361.  Marc Santora & Joanna Berendt, Poland’s Leader Finds an Ally in Trump, Even as 
He Brings Courts to Heel, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/
17/world/europe/poland-courts.html; Griff Witte, Judge’s Boycotting Poland’s Supreme Court 
Posts, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/polands-
judges-boycott-supreme-court-posts-accusing-the-government-of-a-takeover-
bid/2018/08/17/8a9a5590-943a-11e8-818b-e9b7348cd87d_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.8ebc42856185 [https://perma.cc/BS92-JBTY] (130 applicants from 
other legal professions and ministry officials “after the government loosened the eligibility 
requirements,” many with “close ties to Law and Justice”).  
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but, so that they would have standing to challenge the appointment 
process.362 
Judges have organized congresses adopting resolutions against 
government undertakings and legislative measures.363 Iustitia and 
Themis, organizations that together represent the majority of Polish 
judges, have passed resolutions calling on the whole judicial 
community to preserve judicial independence generally and, in 
particular, to refuse to be a candidate for any office that is part of the 
governmental campaign to suppress the judiciary.364 Both associations 
have sanctioned judges who participated in the government attack. One 
of the most visible actions is Iustitia’s expulsion of Łukasz Piebiak, the 
Vice-Minister of Justice, who was once a board member.365  
The legitimately-appointed Constitutional Tribunal judges have 
cited the lack of the competence of the “double-judges” in dissenting 
 
362.  Łukasz Woźnicki, Nowa KRS ponad prawem. Odwołań od decyzji Rady nie będzie 
[New National Judiciary Council above the law. No appeals against their decisions],  
WYBORCZA.PL, (Dec. 16, 2018, 3:36 PM) http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24283186,nowa-krs-
ponad-prawem-odwolan-od-decyzji-rady-nie-bedzie.html#nowaZajawkaGlownaMT;  Poland’s 
judiciary row: administrative court suspends judicial appointment, POLANDIN, 
https://polandin.com/39190749/polands-judiciary-row-administrative-court-suspends-judicial-
appointment [https://perma.cc/BX42-9A5U]; supra note 311 and accompanying text (Polish 
Supreme Administrative Court’s Article 267 referral to the CJEU of cases from such judges).  
363.  Statement of the Association of Polish Judges, IUSTITIA, (July 14, 2018), 
https://www.iustitia.pl/en/118-information/2437-statement-of-the-association-of-polish-
judges-iustitia-of-14-july-2018 [https://perma.cc/EK2B-TXFS]; Position of the Association of 
Judges, THEMIS (July 22, 2018), http://themis-sedziowie.eu/aktualnosci/stanowisko-
stowarzyszenia-sedziow-themis-z-dnia-22-lipca-2018-roku [https://perma.cc/9P6T-BQ2W]. 
Two statements were issued by the Extraordinary Congress of Polish judges after a meeting with 
many voicing criticism and protest, see Resolution of the Extraordinary Congress of Polish 
Judges No. 1, NAT’L COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY, http://krs.pl/pl/konferencje/nadzwyczajny-
kongres-sedziow/p,1/4325,uchwala-nadzwyczajnego-kongresu-sedziow-polskich-nr-1 
[https://perma.cc/5JJK-HHJ9] (last visited July 31, 2018); Resolution of the Extraordinary 
Congress of Polish Judges No. 2, NAT’L COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY, 
http://krs.pl/pl/konferencje/nadzwyczajny-kongres-sedziow/p,1/4326,uchwala-
nadzwyczajnego-kongresu-sedziow-polskich-nr-2 [https://perma.cc/2857-UT4Y] (last visited 
July 31, 2018). 
364.  Co mówią o kandydatach do Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa ich dokumenty [What the 
National Judiciary Council candidates’ documents say about them], TVN24 (Feb. 18, 2018, 9:17 
PM), https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/17-kandydatow-do-krajowej-rady-
sadownictwa-co-mowia-ich-dokumenty,815776.html [https://perma.cc/WK4T-8QLN]. 
365.  Warsaw Branch of the Iustitia Association of Polish Judges Expels Deputy Minister 
of Justice Łukasz Piebiak at the Request of the Iustitia Board, IUSTITIA (Sep. 21, 
2017), https://www.iustitia.pl/informacje/1893-wiceminister-lukasz-piebiak-wykluczony-z-
iustitii [https://perma.cc/Q6UD-D67X]. 
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opinions.366 In response, the law on the Constitutional Tribunal was 
amended to forbid dissenting opinions to refer to a judgment’s heading, 
which includes the names of sitting judges, so the legitimacy of a 
judicial appointment could not be questioned.367 Perhaps the 
legitimately-elected Constitutional Tribunal judges should have 
refused to sit in panels with the “double-judges” or resigned. With new 
appointments to the Supreme Court and ordinary courts, many current 
judges will face similar dilemmas.  
Polish journalist Ewa Siedlecka recently published a more-than-
600-page book detailing the history of judicial independence in Poland, 
analyzing past and current complaints about judges and the judicial 
system, PiS complaints about and initiatives toward the judiciary, and 
the current activities in which judges are engaged.368 The final pages 
provide lists of judges who have made decisions criticized by PiS, are 
active in the judicial opposition to post-2015 changes, and against 
whom authorities have moved in some way.369 
In January 2017, some Polish prosecutors formed Lex super 
omnia (Law above all) with the stated aim of making the Polish 
prosecutor’s office operate constitutionally.370  On January 26, 2019 
100 members of the about 200-member organization attended a 
meeting at which they unanimously passed a resolution calling on the 
Association’s Board to assess incidents of abuse of power and 
harassment of prosecutors by the management of the Prosecutor’s 
Office that should be reported as crimes or disciplinary violations.371  
 
366.  See, e.g., TK: Leo Kieres dissenting to the judgment in the case of the assemblies Kp 
1/17, MONITOR KONSTYTUCYJNY (Apr. 25, 2017), http://monitorkonstytucyjny.eu/archiwa/360 
[https://perma.cc/FCF8-NU79]. 
367.  Par. 54. 1 regulaminu Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 27 lipca 2017, Monitor Polski 
2017 poz. 76; [Constitutional Tribunal Rules, para. 54, point 1 (July 27, 2017)]. 
368.  Ewa Siedlecka, supra note 324; Sędziowie wolności [AKTUALIZOWANA LISTA 
SIEDLECKIEJ – JUŻ 297 NAZWISK] [Judges of Freedom (Siedlecka’s list with 297 names)], 
OKO.PRESS (Dec 27, 2018),  https://oko.press/sedziow-wolnosc-lista-siedleckiej/ 
[https://perma.cc/KFW5-35TA]. 
369.  Id. at 593-619.  
370.  O nas, STOWARZYSZENIE PROKURATORÓW, “LEX SUPER OMNIA,” http://lexso.org.
pl/o-nas/ [https://perma.cc/8SZP-QCTA] (stated aim and including difficulties presented by 
Polish authorities with receiving registration including demands by the District Prosecutor in 
Warsaw for their founding document and list of members) 
371.  Mariusz Jałoszewski & Bartosz Kocejko, Jednomyślna uchwała stowarzyszenia 
prokuratorów: Ziobro musi natychmiast ustąpić, [Unanimous resolution of the prosecutors' 
association: Ziobro must give way immediately], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 26, 2019), 
https://oko.press/uchwala-stowarzyszenia-prokuratorow-ziobro-musi-natychmiast-ustapic/ 
[https://perma.cc/YR26-TZ7E].  
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The resolution outlines some pertinent examples including demotion of 
113 prosecutors and involuntary transfers to other cities as quasi-
disciplinary penalties.372  The assembly, with one dissenting vote, also 
passed a resolution calling on Minister of Justice and Prosecutor 
General Ziobro to resign to halt the politicization of the Polish 
prosecutors’ office.373  In passing the resolutions, prosecutors referred 
to the judges’ example, saying they will defend prosecutorial 
independence as well, despite the harassment and disciplinary charges 
that have already occurred and they expect to continue.374  The head of 
the Iustitia Judges’ Association attended attended the prosecutors’ 
meeting and called on unity among the legal professions in fighting for 
the rule of law.375 
Professor Shimon Shetreet describes judicial independence as a 
foundational value of a judicial system, a value that must be supported 
by a culture of judicial independence.376 This condition is usually 
created through a “long and gradual process,” with the “political 
leadership and the professional and legal elite” working together to 
develop this culture to protect, support, and nurture judicial 
independence.”377 Poland has had less than thirty years to build such a 
culture in a post-communist society. David Kosař makes a similar point 
about forging a shared sense of “judicial virtue,” meaning a common 
understanding among at least academics, lawyers, and judges about 
what a “good judge” is.378 Kosař contrasts the many years that 
established democracies have had to create this identity with the short 
 
372.  Id. 
373.  Id. 
374.  Mariusz Jałoszewski, Prokuratorzy nie boją się dyscyplinarek i idą na zwarcie ze 
Zbigniewem Ziobrą [Prosecutors are not afraid of disciplines and go against Zbigniew Ziobro], 
OKO.PRESS (Jan. 26, 2019), https://oko.press/prokuratorzy-nie-boja-sie-dyscyplinarek-i-ida-
na-zwarcie-ze-zbigniewem-ziobra/ [https://perma.cc/2N65-HAEJ].  
375.  Id. 
376.  Shetreet, supra note 3, at 17 (addressing the importance of an independent legal 
profession in creating an independent judiciary in post-communist societies); id. at 18 
(mentioning other important values, such as procedural fairness, efficiency, accessibility, and 
public confidence in the courts). 
377.  Id. at 20-21 (pointing out that it took 140 years for the US Federal Judiciary to move 
from administration under a cabinet department in the executive branch to its current self-
judicial governance system). 
378.  KOSAŘ, supra note 4, at 19, 430; Sadurski, supra note 9, at 57 (limits of structural 
safeguards, young democracies’ propensity for “backsliding,” and importance of the people at 
large valuing democracy). 
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time since Central and Eastern European countries emerged from 
communism.379  
Polish judges have taken stands that may end their careers and 
possibly bring worse consequences.380 They have had to think and talk 
daily about what it means to be a judge. If the light at the end of the 
tunnel appears, Polish society could emerge with a stronger culture of 
judicial independence and sense of judicial “accountability-as-a-
virtue.” That, however, is a big “if” and one that likely would bring 
with it a host of difficult legal and political problems such as those 
identified in Part IV. 
The Roundtable political forces, which included current PiS Party 
Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński in the Solidarity group, insisted on a 
strong form of judicial independence with considerable insulation of 
judges from political forces. Perhaps they recognized the “long gradual 
process” necessary to build a “culture of judicial independence” and 
sense of “judicial virtue.” They may have anticipated the undemocratic 
and authoritarian potential of Polish society (not unique to Poland), 
which under specific circumstances could awakened.381 The 
Roundtable framework’s bulwarks of judicial independence at least 
have delayed bringing Polish courts under political control. The judges 
themselves, in cooperation with lawyers and nongovernmental 
organizations, have provided much of the information necessary for 
European and international organizations to issue reports and take 
action. Thus far, though, it is not clear whether the dismantling of 
judicial institutions can be halted and the Polish courts’ capacity to 
review government action impartially without threat can be restored. 
 
379.  Id. at 428-30.  
380.  Supra notes 344-56 and accompanying text; Mariusz Jałoszewski, Szykują czwartą 
dyscyplinarkę dla sędziego Żurka. Ofensywa na nieposłusznych [They are preparing a fourth 
discipline for judge Żurek. Offensive against the disobedient], OKO.PRESS (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://oko.press/szykuja-czwarta-dyscyplinarke-dla-sedziego-zurka-ofensywa-na-
nieposlusznych/ [https://perma.cc/V3SV-PYHA] (disciplinary actions and possible other forms 
of harassment against Waldemar Żurek, spokesperson for the now-dismissed National Judiciary 
Council and one of the most vocal critics of judiciary “reform”).  
381.  See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 97-117 
(2018) (discussing how laws, governmental structures, and constitutions alone cannot protect 
democracy when important actors disregard “guardrails,” the norms and unwritten rules of 
mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance, which preserve democracy).  
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IV. THE FUTURE 
Given the speed with which the Polish government has acted, 
effective control of the judiciary may be achieved before action by the 
European Union, pressure from other external forces, or electoral 
change can halt the process. A future elected government, willing to 
reestablish a legitimate framework of rule of law within the Polish 
Constitution, European law requirements, and international norms, will 
face grave legal and policy issues. 
A recent Stefan Batory Foundation report considers that the three 
“double judges” sitting on the Constitutional Tribunal were not 
appointed lawfully, and that the selection process for the current CT 
President was fatally flawed.382 Hence, the status of cases on which the 
currently constituted CT rules is uncertain. Furthermore, now Chief 
Judge Przyłębska regularly changes panel compositions in a way the 
report considers not to comply with the laws on the Constitutional 
Tribunal.383 The unconstitutional composition of the NJC also could be 
considered to result in wrongful appointment of judges to the Supreme 
and ordinary courts, which in turn would call into question the entire 
judicial system’s operation and decisions in this period.384 
If opposition parties gain a governing majority, they would likely 
still not achieve the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional 
change. Hence, the restoration of rule of law would have to occur 
within the existing Constitution. The Constitution’s provisions, 
however, do not address an emergency restoration of the rule of law; 
 
382.  STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION, ANALIZA DZIALALNOSCI ORZECZNICZEJ 
TYBUNALU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO W LATACH 2014-2017 [ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRIBUNAL DECISION-MAKING IN 2014-2017], available at http://www.batory.org.pl/
upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Raport%20ZEP%20o%20
funkcjonowaniu%20TK.pdf [https://perma.cc/X44A-B5UA] (showing this proves also the 
dramatic drop in efficiency of the “new” Constitutional Tribunal disputing that PiS reforms are 
aimed at improved functioning of the affected institutions). Co-author Zoll is a member of the 
Legal Experts Group of the Batory Foundation. 
383.  Łukasz Wożnicki, Bunt w TK. Siedmioro sędziów: Julia Przyłębska łamie prawo 
[Rebellion in the Constitutional Tribunal. Seven judges: Julia Przlębska breaks the law], 
WYBORCZA.PL (Dec. 12, 2018, 3:13 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,24270409,bunt-w-tk-
siedmioro-sedziow-julia-przylebska-lamie-prawo.html [https://perma.cc/9S6P-QEER].  
384.  BATORY FOUNDATION, supra note 382; Łukasz Wożnicki, Profesorowie 
Strzembosz i Zoll: Decyzje nowej KRS będą nieważne [Professors Strzembosz and Zoll: New 
KRS decisions will be invalid], wyborcza.pl (Mar. 7, 2018, 4:51 PM), http://wyborcza.pl/
7,75398,23113085,profesorowie-strzembosz-i-zoll-decyzje-nowej-krs-beda-niewazne.html 
[https://perma.cc/DRM4-B8UC] (warning about invalidity of the newly-constituted NJC 
actions); see supra note 47 regarding Professor Andrzej Zoll’s background and relationship to 
co-author Fryderyk Zoll.   
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its provisions on emergency situations and martial law may not match 
the existing situation. 
Restoring rule of law must be guided by two major principles: 
wrong must be undone but proportional to the remedy needed without 
causing excessive damage. Although judgments may have been 
rendered within an unconstitutional, and hence illegal, framework, 
people will have relied upon them. A new government could be 
tempted to use a device like the PiS Supreme Court Extraordinary 
Appeals Chamber to displace and revise grossly illegal judgments, but 
it would be a mistake to replicate the PiS government’s 
unconstitutional means to restore rule of law. 
In addition to the legality questions regarding all judicial 
appointments made through an illegally-constituted National Judiciary 
Council, a future democratic regime will have to consider the judges 
who serve in the new Chamber for Extraordinary Appeals and Public 
Affairs and the Disciplinary Chamber. As described in Part II.B, the 
Extraordinary Appeals Chamber has the potential to destabilize the 
entire legal system by challenging final judgments from the past twenty 
years. The Extraordinary Appeals and Public Affairs Chamber also has 
jurisdiction over the validity of elections, the crucial last resort for 
Polish democracy. 
A judge’s position in that chamber alone, however, does not raise 
the same moral issues as sitting in the new Disciplinary Chamber. The 
Disciplinary Chamber is a potential sword hanging over all the 
country’s lawyers and judges. Judges joining this Chamber, and 
receiving the forty percent higher salary it brings, are in a position to 
be the government’s instrument of political control.385 The Ministry of 
Justice already has tried to influence the behavior of judges or 
prosecutors by threatening them with the risk of the disciplinary 
procedure.386 Hence, we can be anticipate the Chamber will be used as 
 
385.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
386.  Mariusz Jałoszewski, Ziobro się nie podoba? Będą dyscyplinarki. Prokuratura ucisza 
niepokornych prokuratorów [Ziobro does not like it? There will be discipline. The Prosecutor’s 
office silences rebellious prosectuors], OKO.PRESS (March 29, 2017), https://oko.press/ziobro-
sie-podoba-beda-dyscyplinarki-uciszanie-niepokornych-prokuratorow/ [https://perma.cc
/QJ7W-X4WC]; Michał Kucyński, Minister sprawiedliwości posunął się za dleko? Zbigniew 
Ziobro grozi Prof. Gersdorf [Has the Minister of Justice gone too far? Zbigniew Ziobro 
threatens Professor Gersdorf], CROWD MEDIA (June 25, 2018), https://crowdmedia.pl/
minister-sprawiedliwosci-posunal-sie-za-daleko-zbigniew-ziobro-grozi-prof-gersdorf/ 
[https://perma.cc/XEV2-N6DK] (quoting Minister of Justice Ziobro raising the possibility of a 
prosecution in the new Disciplinary Chamber for Supreme Court First President Malgorzata 
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an “accountability perversion.”387 Service in this chamber should be a 
per se disqualification for future judicial office, a fundamental value of 
which is judicial independence from political control. 
Judges appointed through illegal procedures should not benefit 
from the guarantees of prohibition on judicial removal designed to 
protect judicial independence.388 A reconstituted National Judiciary 
Council would have to devise a method of individual review for judges 
appointed under unconstitutional procedures. Judges who by their 
allegiance to the PiS regime have violated their judiciary oath requiring 
the preservation of judicial independence probably will need to be 
dismissed—albeit in a process with adequate due process to hear their 
defenses. Judges who have been elected to the illegal Judiciary Council 
and accepted appointment should not occupy any position in the justice 
system of a democratic Poland observing the principles of the rule of 
law. Some judges already are suffering consequences for their 
resistance. More likely will do so. A process will have to be established 
to determine what is necessary to “undo” actions taken against them, 
reinstate people who resigned or lost their positions, and consider 
compensation for losses. 
The Ministry of Justice will require major reorganization. The 
practice of seconding judges to the Ministry of Justice should be 
discontinued. This creates a group of judges who are too close to the 
executive branch of the government and therefore potentially too 
sensitive to political pressure. The Minister of Justice recruited his 
appointees for presidents of the courts and new members of the 
Judiciary Council from this group.389 Although this temporary 
 
Gersdorf for refusing to step down from her position), see supra notes 99 and 100 and 
accompanying text regarding Judge Gersdorf; supra notes 344-355 and accompanying text. 
387.  KOSAŘ, supra note 4, at 7, 9, 13, 57, 68 (regarding how accountability mechanisms 
like judicial discipline can be perverted to influence judicial decision-making through 
prosecution and the threat of punishment). 
388.  The former PiS-Minister of Internal Affairs and Speaker of the Sejm in the 2005-
2007 PiS government has called on all opposition Polish opposition parties to join a common 
statement saying applicants for Supreme Court vacancies under the new system and participating 
in other judiciary “reforms” should be removed in a future government, lose all judicial 
privileges including retirement benefits, and be banned from all legal professions. Ludwik Dorn, 
Opozycja musi sięgnąć po metody Kaczyńskiego. Konstytucji nie obroni w białych 
Rękawiczkach, [Dorn: The opposition must reach for Kaczynski’s methods. The Constitution 
cannot be defended with white gloves], GAZETA.PL (July 13, 2018, 10:28 AM), 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,161770,23668778,dorn-opozycja-musi-siegnac-po-
metody-kaczynskiego-konstytucji.html [https://perma.cc/D8H2-B97J] 
389.  Supra notes 126, 358, 359, and accompanying text. 
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assignment model may work in some countries, e.g., Germany, the 
Polish experience under the current situation shows it should be 
abandoned for Poland, at least for the time being. 
Poland’s prosecution model requires a complete reform. 
Restoring the separation of the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor 
General is not enough. As opposed to the majority of judges who have 
resisted, many prosecutors have bent to the political purposes of the 
executive branch.390 Professionalism and professional independence 
for many Polish prosecutors have evaporated. The prosecution function 
is now perceived to serve the political ends of the ruling power. A 
decentralization of prosecution may be necessary in order to make it 
impossible in the future for the prosecution apparatus to be controlled 
and directed for political ends.391 
Judgments of wrongfully composed courts should not be nullified 
across the board given reliance on them. We do not have a ready answer 
for what to do when an illegally-constituted court has rendered an 
opinion doing an apparent injustice. Perhaps the only way to “undo” 
injustice is for the state to assume liability for damages caused by the 
unlawful operation of the courts. 
The loss of respect for the Constitutional Tribunal is so deep that 
it is difficult to envision how it can be restored. The Constitution’s 
framework limits the possible range of restructuring options. 
Nonetheless, only fundamentally deep reform, a kind of fresh start, 
offers hope for salvation. 
A post-PiS period must look carefully at the fault lines exposed in 
this period of political stress and consider the judicial independence 
mechanisms that were successful in at least delaying the breakdown of 
institutions.392 As raised in the Introduction, achieving an appropriate  
balance between independence and accountability is difficult. One may 
 
390.  For contrary examples, see supra notes 370-375 and accompanying text. 
391.  See supra Part I discussing the check provided by the US federal system. Germany 
also provides a check on prosecution in its federal state. See Sadurski supra note 9 (discussing 
federalism as a veto point providing a check against potential “anti-constitutional,populist 
backsliding”) While Poland is not a federal system, a decentralization of prosecution to lower 
levels of government also could provide a check to a central authority. 
392.  Tomasz Ławnicki, Plan prawnej depisizacji: Nieformalny zespół już pracuje nad 
tym, jak przywrócić właściwy stan prawny [Legal deprivation plan: The informal team is already 
working on how to restore the proper legal status], NA:TEMAT (Dec. 7, 2017), 
http://natemat.pl/224653,plan-prawnej-depisizacji-nieformalny-zespol-juz-pracuje-nad-tym-
jak-przywrocic-wlasciwy-stan-prawny [https://perma.cc/82EN-WCPM] (on expert groups 
working on after-PiS reforms).   
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argue that, from the perspective of everyday functioning, the Polish 
judiciary had too much independence. As discussed in Part III, though, 
the Roundtable political forces may have recognized the potential 
threat to a fledgling democracy of a party with authoritarian 
inclinations. 
The seizure of control over the judiciary by the executive branch, 
and in particular by the Ministry of Justice, will be nearly complete by 
the time this Article is published. Although public pressure, EU actions 
and the Polish government’s reaction to them, and the autumn’s local 
and regional elections offer some hopeful signs, judicial institutions are 
already largely under political control. Judicial independence will 
depend on the character of individuals.  
It is difficult to assess whether the citizens would have been 
quicker to defend a more efficient and responsive judiciary. Poland is 
not the only country seeing how effective disinformation and concerted 
government attacks on the legal system and individuals can be. The 
young Polish democracy was unable to develop sufficient respect for 
its crucial institutions to make them impregnable. The protests in 
defense of the judiciary have grown and become more widespread, but 
it took considerable time for them to become established and have an 
effect. The Polish example offers a cautionary tale for others: reform 
the judiciary system before it is too late by enhancing not only its 
quality and efficiency but also its human approach to the people facing 
justice. 
In Poland, a new justice system will have to be built carefully and 
in a dialogue with society explaining the judiciary’s role and relevance 
for the country. The light at the end of tunnel is only flickering. 
Nonetheless, the democratic community in Poland must prepare for the 
transition back to the rule of law. Future reform must not only undo the 
demolition of the justice system but also use this experience to create a 
system that better serves the needs of the society and is able to survive 
political stress. 
 
